



A DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERNAL PLANNING PROCESSES
OF THE MAJOR U. S. MILITARY AIRFRAME BUILDERS
by
John D. Finnerty
The Systems Acquisition Research Program
February 1977









The work reported herein was supported by the Foundation Research Program of the
Naval Postgraduate School with funds provided by the Chief of Naval Research.
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized.
Prepared by
f^
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
A DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERNAL PLANNING PROCESSES
OF THE MAJOR U.S. MILITARY AIRFRAME BUILDERS
5. TYPE OF REPORT 4 PERIOD COVERED
Partial Report for
October 1976-December 1976
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORfsj
John D. Firmer ty
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERS
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, Ca. 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS
6H52N, RR 000-01-01
N000H77WR70044




13. NUMBER OF PAGES
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESSf*/ different from Controlling Office) 15. SECURITY CLASS, (of this report)
Unclassified
15«. DECLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered In Block 20, If different from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aide il necessary and Identity by block number)
Military Airframe Builder Planning
Aerospace Industry Objectives
Monopsony Strategic Plan
Risk Long Term Plan
Diversification Operating Plan
Short Term Plan
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse aide If necessary and Identity by block number)
This paper describes the long term and short term planning processes of the
nine major military airframe builders in the United States. The first part
of the paper characterizes the nine firms and explores the risks and rewards
inherent in their dependence on their major customer, the United States
Government. The remainder of the paper provides a description of the internal
planning processes that is based on personal interviews of the planning
executives of the nine firms. The environmental forecast, which precedes




AN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014- 6601 |
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)
.LIIJRITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS P AGEQWun D'te Entered) _
20. review process, in which actual performance is measured against
the
short term plan, are also discussed.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEfWW Date Entered)
ABSTRACT
This paper describes the long term and short term planning
processes of the nine major military airframe builders in the
United States. The first part of the paper characterir.es the
nine firms and explores the risks and rewards inherent in their
dependence on their major customer, the United States Government.
The remainder of the paper provides a description of the internal
planning processes that is based on personal interviews of the
planning executives of the nine firms. The environmental fore-
cast, which precedes the formulation of the long term and short
term plans, and the corporate review process, in which actual





SECTION A: INTRODUCTION 7
SECTION B: AN OVERVIEW OF THE NINE MAJOR MILITARY AIRFRAME
BUILDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 11
1. Introduction 11
2. Size and Diversification 13
3. Aerospace Research and the Aircraft Development
Process 18
4. The Aircraft Production Process and the Learning
Curve 21
5. The Importance of Government Sales 25
6. Doing Business with the Government: Risks and
Regulations 29
a. The Buyer-Seller Relationship 31
b. Financial Risks and Business Risks 35
c. The Government-Airframe Contractor Relationship:
Allocation of Risks by Contract Type 42
7. Diversification: Balancing Government Business and
Commercial Business 44




SECTION C: BACKGROUND TO THE PLANNING PROCESS: THE OBJECTIVES
OF THE FIRM 54
1 The Planning Process 54
2. The Objectives of the Firm 58
SECTION D : THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORECAST 64
1 The Corporate Planning Cycle 64
2. The Environmental Forecast: Its Purpose and Its
Structure 65
TABLE OF CONTENTS CONT.
PAGE





2. Long Term Planning at the Divisional Level 70
3. Long Term Planning: Government Sales and the Going-
Out-Of-Business Curve 75
4 Long Term Planning: Commercial Sales 81
5. Long Term Planning: Human Capital and Fixed Capital.
.
86
6. Long Term Planning as a Portfolio Selection Problem... 91
7. Summary 94
SECTION F: SHORT TERM PLANNING: ANNUAL BUDGET PREPARATION 95
1. Introduction 95
2. Short Term Planning at the Divisional Level 96
3. Short Term Planning: Government Sales, Contract
Performance, and Cost Controls 101
4. Short Term Planning: Commercial Sales and Operating
Efficiency 103
5 Summary 105
SECTION G: THE CORPORATE REVIEW PROCESS 106
SECTION H: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 110
REFERENCES 139
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 145
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE NO. TITLE PAGE
1 Profile of the Nine Major Airframe Builders
by Major Military Program 8
2 Profile of the Nine Major Airframe Builders
by Sales and New Military Contract Awards 14
3 Diversification of the Nine Major Airframe Builders
as Indicated by 1975 Product Line Net Sales 16
4 Proportion of the Nine Major Airframe Builders'
1975 Net Sales Made to the Government 27
5 Profile of the Nine Major Airframe Builders
by Profitability and Growth 46
6 Proportion of the Nine Major Airframe Builders'
1975 Net Income Earned on Sales to the Government 50
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE NO. TITLE PAGE
1 80 Percent Learning Curve 22
2 The Headquarters-Division Planning Relationship 57
3 The Corporate Planning Cycle 65
4 The Divisional Long Term Planning Cycle 71
5 Going-Out-Of-Business Curve With Overlays 77
6 Projections of Long Term Demand for Commercial
Aircraft 84
7 The Divisional Short Term Planning Cycle 98
8 The Corporate Planning and Review Cycle 109
A DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERNAL
PLANNING PROCESSES OF THE MAJOR
U.S. MILITARY AIRFRAME BUILDERS
A. INTRODUCTION
Over the last five years many articles have appeared in the
business literature describing the problems that in recent years
have plagued the United States aerospace industry, and in partic-
2
ular, the major military airframe builders - the nine firms
listed in Table 1 that serve as prime contractors for the pro-
duction of the tactical, bomber, and support aircraft used by the
Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy to carry out their re-
spective missions. There have been reports of an impending shake-
out of makers of tactical planes, due mainly to the apparent re-
duction in the number of contracts for new military tactical air-
3
craft. A prolonged slump in defense spending for weapons systems
procurement that began in 1970 and the political debate over the
future of the Bl bomber program that delayed - and still threatens
to put an end to - its production placed added pressure on the
4
stability of the industry. In addition, commercial aircraft sales
5
fell dramatically as airline passenger traffic leveled off, pre-
cipitating a financial crisis for one of the three major vroc^ ucers
of both commercial and military aircraft.
More recently, the 1976 national elections and the well-publicized
upturn in real defense spending that began the same year have drawn
the attention of not only the business community, but also the public
,
Table 1: Profile of the Nine Major Airframe
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1. Or soon to go into production.
2. Uses the Boeing 707 airframe.
3. Uses the Boeing 747 airframe.
4. Total deliveries of approximately 5000 aircraft.
5. Total deliveries of approximately 3000 aircraft.
6. The F-18 will be produced jointly by McDonnell Douglas and Northrop.
Sources: Company Form 10-K reports for company fiscal year 1975
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
to the defense industry - those firms that produce the weapons systems
on which the nation's defense depends. More importantly, the turn-
about in defense spending has brightened the general outlook for the
aerospace industry considerably. New arms programs, such as the
F-16 to be produced by General Dynamics and the F-18 to be produced
jointly by McDonnell Douglas and Northrop, have meant that, for some
aerospace firms at least, the future looks very bright. For others,
however, the trend toward longer production runs and fewer contracts
threatens their continued existence as prime contractors. Indeed, in
the absence of a sufficient number of new programs, a shakeout will
occur and the victims will be forced to increase foreign sales or
to work as subcontractors, or else to drop out of the aircraft end of
the aerospace business altogether.
The next section describes these and several other problems that
confront the major airframe builders, and in particular, how the
uncertainties concerning the future state of product market demand,
future resource availabilities and costs, etc., that all firms face
are compounded by the technological uncertainties that result from
having to push the state of the art each time a new weapons system
is developed, and in addition, by a dwindling number of contracts
from its principal customer - the Department of Defense - that threa-
tens several firms' survival as prime contractors. In such a business
environment, the need for effective corporate planning to somehow
deal with these uncertainties is, in the opinion of this writer, crit-
ical. The development of a new weapons system normally requires
several years or longer from conception to production. In addition,
the financial resources necessary to support the research and de-
velopment effort are scarce - even though the Department of Defense
does provide partial financial assistance through the distribution
of independent research and development (hereafter referred to as
IR&D) funds and in recent years has demonstrated a willingness to
Q
fund development programs on a cost-plus basis. For these rea-
sons it is necessary that these firms exercise particular care and
forethought in allocating their scarce financial resources. Just
as important, each of these firms must also allocate its highly
skilled design and engineering talent among existing and proposed
future projects. In each case the problem confronting the firm's
managers is one of deciding how best to allocate the firm's re-
sources to meet their own objectives and the objectives of the firm's
9
shareholders.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a description of the
long term and short term planning processes of the nine major mili-
tary airframe builders in the United States. The focal point for
the discussion is how these planning processes are designed to en-
sure an allocation of the firm's fixed and variable resources that
is consistent with the firm's goals and objectives. Section C sets
out the general objectives the major airframe builders seek to ac-
complish when they plan their long term strategies and annual opera-
tions. Sections D through F discuss in broad terms the internal
planning processes of these firms.
10
The description represents a synthesis of these firms' planning pro-
cedures, rather than an attempt to describe with perfect accuracy
how any one firm plans. Though there are certain differences in how
these firms plan, these differences are, in the opinion of this
writer, differences of detail rather than of substance, and there
is sufficient commonality in the ways these firms plan to justify
the synthesis attempted here. Section G, which describes the cor-
porate review process that follows the planning processes and Sec-
tion H, which presents the summary and conclusions complete the
paper.
Before proceeding to the discussion of planning, it may prove
helpful to the reader to provide an overview of the major military
airframe builders: their distinguishing characteristics, the pe-
culiar problems they face, and their rather special relationship
with their main customer, the Department of Defense (hereafter DOD)
.
This is the purpose of the next section.
B. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NINE MAJOR MILITARY AIRFRAME BUILDERS IN THE
UNITED STATES
1. Introduction
The United States aerospace industry is composed of approxi-
mately 50 major manufacturing firms ' together with hundreds of
other smaller firms that produce parts and auxiliary equipment.
The industry is a large contributor to the nation's output and em-
ployment. During 1975 aerospace sales made a direct contribution
to gross national product of 1.9 percent, and accounted for 2.6
11
percent of all manufacturing sales and 5.4 percent of durable goods
12
production. Aerospace employment during 1975 averaged 942,000
workers, or approximately 1.5 percent of total civilian employment
13
and 5.1 percent of total employment in manufacturing. Also
during 1975, U.S. aerospace firms rung up a record trade surplus
of $7 billion, or approximately 75 percent of the total U.S. trade
surplus.
The output of the aerospace industry consists chiefly of air-
craft, missiles, space systems, parts, and auxiliary equipment. Of
these products, civil and military aircraft account for nearly 55
percent of the industry's output. Of all the firms in the aero-
space industry, there are nine - Boeing, Fairchild, General Dynamics,
1 (.
Grumman, LTV, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, Northrop, and Rockwell -
that serve as the prime contractors for all of the major tactical,
bomber, and support aircraft used by the military. In addition,
three of the nine - Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas -
are the principal producers of large commercial aircraft in the United
17
States.
Turning to the buying side, during 1975 the federal government
purchased nearly 60 percent of the aerospace industry's output, and
over the last decade, the federal government's share of the industry's
18
output has reached as much as 74 percent. This dependence on
government sales makes aerospace production susceptible to large swings
in the level of government demand, as national policy and economic
19
conditions change and as the nation experiences alternating periods
20
of war and peace. In addition, the business cycle, as it affects
12
national disposable income and the demand for commercial airline
travel, causes fluctuations in the demand for commercial aircraft.
When the two cycles coincide, as they have in recent years, output
21
and employment within the aerospace industry can fall dramatically.
The remainder of this section characterizes the nine major mili-
tary airframe builders and explores the major risks associated with
these firms' heavy dependence on a single customer.
2. Size and Diversification
The nine major military airframe builders are large multi-
product companies whose sales are, in general, heavily weighted to-
ward aerospace products. There are, however, important differences
in the extent to which these companies have diversified away from
the aerospace business.
Table 2 provides a profile of the nine firms according to the
1975 sales of each and the value of new military contracts won by
each during fiscal year 1975. Eight of the nine firms are among the
500 largest industrial corporations in the United States, as ranked
according to annual sales by Fortune magazine. The ninth largest,
Fairchild Industries, falls within the upper range of the second 500
largest. Six of the firms are among the 100 largest. What the table
does not show is that several of the firms have experienced some slip-
page in their rankings since 1970 due to a shrinkage in orders for
22
military and commercial aircraft. Nevertheless, these firms re-
23
main large, and one would expect that they face problems of organ-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2 also indicates where the nine firms fall in relation
to the other firms that make up the list of the top 100 DOD contrac-
tors. Five of the top six DOD contractors are airframe builders,
and the nine major airframe builders all fall within the top 34 DOD
24
contractors. The nine firms collectively accounted for almost
25 percent of new military contracts awarded during fiscal year 1975.
It is apparent, then, that how well these firms plan and conduct their
operations will be of considerable interest to DOD. Not only is DOD
one of the biggest buyers of the products of each firm, but also,
each firm is among DOD's largest suppliers of durable goods.
Table 3 shows how the sales of each of the nine companies are
distributed among aircraft, missiles and space, and non-aerospace
product lines. Four companies - Boeing, Fairchild, Grumman, and
McDonnell Douglas - derive at least 80 percent of total revenue from
the sale of aircraft, engines, parts, and auxiliary equipment, and
these four companies, as well as Lockheed, each earn at least 90
percent of total revenue from the sale of these items and missiles
and space equipment. For these five firms, non-aerospace production
constitutes a relatively small part of the firm's total operations.
In contrast, General Dynamics, LTV, Northrop, and Rockwell appear
much less dependent on aerospace sales, with, for example, the sale
of aerospace products amounting to only 12 percent of LTV's 1975 sales
However, even though the percentage contribution of aerospace sales
may be relatively small, large variations in the level of such sales
might still have a significant impact on the firm's profit and loss
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spectrum, if a firm derives 80 percent or more of its revenue from the
sale of aircraft and related parts and equipment, then the performance
of the company is highly sensitive to variations in the demand for
aircraft, For such firms, this greater dependence on sales of air-
craft makes the need for a planning organization that can cope with
the cyclical fluctuations inherent in the demand for commercial and
military aircraft all the more pressing.
The picture of the major airframe builders that has emerged thus
far is one of large firms that have diversified away from aerospace
production to varying degrees, but that are still very much depen-
dent for their overall success on the success of their aerospace
operations. The next two subsections discuss the important character-
istics of the aerospace research and development process and the
aircraft production process and suggest several important implica-
tions for the internal planning processes of the major airframe
builders.
3. Aerospace Research and the Aircraft Development Process
It is a characteristic of the aerospace industry that each
new product pushes the state of the art. Whether the new product
is a new military fighter aircraft capable of reaching greater speeds
and carrying heavier payloads than its predecessors or a new commer-
cial passenger jet that can achieve greater fuel economy while meeting
more stringent noise standards, the development of the aircraft re-
quires the expenditure of large sums of money for highly skilled sci-
entific and engineering talent. Usually these expenditures must be
spread over a long period of time before the aircraft is ready for
18
production. Often seven to 10 years - and sometimes even longer -
25
will elapse between program initiation and completion.
The long and expensive research and development process has im-
portant implications for the aerospace industry in general and for
the major airframe builders in particular. First, the industry is
labor-intensive, employing as many salaried workers as production
workers. In 1975 the U.S. aerospace industry employed nearly
20 percent of all U.S. scientists and engineers engaged in research
and development, and at times this percentage has been as high as
30 percent. These scientists and engineers and the knowledge and
experience they possess constitute a valuable capital resource, the
efficient allocation of which is critical to each firm's overall
27
,performance. It is of some concern to corporate planners, then,
that major programs be time-phased in such a way that the firm's
scientific and engineering talent can be kept fully employed in
jobs requiring their skills.
A second implication of the special character of the research
and development process in the aerospace industry is that large
sums of money capital must be raised in order to finance the re-
search and development process. For example, the production of a
new commercial jet might require as much as $2 billion in research
and development and initial production costs before the firm begins
28
to recover its investment - a sum that far exceeds the net worth
29
of any of the commercial airframe builders. The financial pres-
sures these firms face are, however, mitigated to a great extent by
19
government funding of IR&D, by development contracts that are typ-
30ically awarded on a cost-plus-fee basis, and, in the case of
commercial aircraft development, by the spillover effects of research
funded at least in part by IR&D money. Indeed, the aerospace in-
dustry is an anomaly among U.S. industries due to the extent to which
the government - mainly through DOD and NASA, although the latter has
diminished in importance rapidly in recent years as the total space
31
effort has wound down - finances its research and development.
As an example of the importance of government funding, Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation spent $52.8 million of its own funds on research
and development during 1975, but received more than $480 million
from DOD for defense-related research and development, testing, and
32
evaluation.
A third implication of the special nature of the aerospace in-
dustry's research and development process is the risks - technological,
financial, and otherwise - inherent in expending large sums of money
on new products that push the state of the art and that, in the case
of new weapons systems, will lead to actual production only if the
proposed weapons system (i.e. the prototype) survives a winner-take-
33
all competition for the right to go into production. As far as
research and development per se is concerned, the main risk is that
associated with technological uncertainty, namely, whether the firm
will be able to make the required advances in the state of the art
within a 'reasonable' period of time and at a 'reasonable' cost in
accordance with its contract.
A fourth implication of the special character of the industry's
20
research and development process is that the length of the process
often makes it necessary for the firm's planners to look well be-
yond the five-year outlook provided by the Five Year Defense Plan
in order to determine how to allocate defense-related research
and development funds. While some guidance is provided by the
projects on which DOD will permit IR&D funds to be spent, the
35
airframe builders cannot rely on this source of information alone.
Moreover, for commercial markets there is nothing akin to a Five
Year Defense Plan. Hence, planning the allocation of research and
development funds necessitates projections of military and com-
mercial needs in the next decade and beyond, and, needless to say,
these projections involve a high degree of uncertainty. Coping
with such uncertainty requires corporate planners to make certain
adjustments in the way they plan, and these adjustments are dis-
cussed below in Section E.
This subsection has discussed the research and development
requirements that underlie aircraft production and some of the
important implications of the nature of this process and for each
of the firm's planners. The next subsection takes a look inside
these firms at the aircraft production process and at what the
nature of this process implies for corporate planners.
4. The Aircraft Production Process and the Learning Curve
It has long been recognized by aeronautical engineers that
36 .
airframe production is characterized by a learning process. As
the total number of airframes produced of a particular type increases,




This is due to the fact that, as the airframe is
put together, items such as hydraulic systems, fuel lines,
electrical wiring, and avionics gear must be installed by hand. As
the total number of airframes increases, the production workers who
install these items become more proficient - the experience gained
on previous airframes has taught them what goes where, so that air-
craft drawings need not be consulted as often as on earlier air-
frames, and has also taught them the best order in which to install
the various items.
Studies of airframe production have revealed the shape of the
oo
learning curve. The typical learning curve is what is called an
'80 percent curve'
,
which means that every time airframe production
is doubled, the direct labor input per airframe declines by 20 per-
cent, or equivalently, falls to 80 percent of what it was before pro-
duction doubled. Such a curve is shown below in Figure 1, where it
has been assumed that the first airframe requires a direct labor in-
39









8000 man-hours at airframe no. 1
6400 man-hours at airframe no. 2
5120 man-hours at airframe no. 4
4096 man-hours at airframe no,
1816 man-hours
at airframe no. 100
1 2 k 100 Cumulative
Aircraft Output
Figure 1 : 80 Percent Learning Curve
22
It should be emphasized that the learning curve, and the process
of learning by doing that it embodies, applies to all airframes sin-
gly. Each completely new airframe requires that the learning pro-
cess begin anew. This is one reason why corporate planning within
the major airframe builders proceeds on a more or less airframe-
by-air frame basis. This point is developed further in later sections.
The existence of the learning curve has several important im-
plications for corporate planners in addition to the one just men-
tioned. First, the fall in the direct labor input per airframe means
that, barring major design changes that seriously disrupt the learn-
ing process or a surge in inflation that sharply increases the cost
of labor and other inputs, both the marginal fly-away cost and the
average fly-away cost of a particular type of aircraft tend to fall
40
as the cumulative number of units produced increases. This
would imply that, from a cost standpoint at least, it is more eco-
nomical to have a smaller variety of aircraft in order to derive
maximum benefit from the learning curve. Thus, it might be argued
that producing a common lightweight fighter aircraft that meets the
needs of both the Navy and the Air Force, rather than producing a
different airplane for each, would enable the government to take
maximum advantage of the learning curve. It should be emphasized
that such commonality can prove to be more cost-effective (rather
than simply less costly) only if a compromise design that will
41
effectively satisfy each service's needs proves feasible.
Second, the existence of a learning curve makes it impractical
for the Department of Defense either to have more than one firm
23
build a particular type of aircraft or to switch contractors once
production has begun. In the first case, the full benefits of the
learning curve could not be derived (i.e. for any given budget,
fewer aircraft would be produced), and in the second case, the new
contractor would have to begin at the top of the learning curve
and a portion of the overall cost savings that had previously been
possible would have to be sacrificed. Thus, by the time an airframe
builder has won the initial production contract, there is no longer
42
any effective competition on the selling side of the market, and
the government-contractor relationship becomes one of bilateral
43
monopoly. The significance of this is explored further below.
Third, the learning curve gives rise to a special problem for
the producers of commercial aircraft, which are typically fixed-
priced. Before fixing the price and announcing the price to the
commercial airlines, the producer must make a careful assessment
of the likely future demand for his product, for the lower is the
price, the greater is the number of planes that must be sold before
the break-even point is reached. An overly optimistic demand
projection - say, one that overestimates either the need for addi-
tional carrying capacity or the need for replacement aircraft (or
both) - can lead the producer to charge a price that implies an
unattainably high break-even point, and, as Lockheed's L-1011 ex-
perience demonstrates, to intolerably large losses should the ex-
44
pected sales fail to materialize. While the risk of such losses
would tend to discourage the firm from setting the break-even point
too high, the existence of strong competition among sellers of
24
commercial aircraft, as well as each producer's desire to sell suf-
ficient numbers of aircraft to keep its production lines in con-
tinuous operation, push prices in the opposite direction by tending
to make producers overly optimistic with regard to how fast they
can proceed down the learning curve.
A fourth implication of the existence of the learning curve
concerns the relationship between the production of commercial
aircraft and the production of military aircraft. If a producer
of both commercial and military aircraft can win a contract to
produce a military plane that utilizes the same airframe as one of
45
the company's commercial planes, then that company will gain an
advantage over its commercial competitors to the extent that it is
able to progress down the learning curve more quickly than it could
have otherwise. Of course, the military buyer also benefits by
saving, not only on research and development costs, but also on a
portion of what it would otherwise have cost to produce the military
airframes. This is yet one more important aspect of the interface
between government sales and commercial sales.
This and preceding subsections have menioned the importance of
government sales to the major airframe builders. The next two sub-
sections look more closely at the importance of government sales and
at the risks involved in doing work under contract for the govern-
ment.
5. The Importance of Government Sales
During 1975 almost 60 percent of the aerospace industry's
46
total output was purchased by the federal government. For the
25
nine major airframe builders the proportion of total net sales
made to the government was somewhat less, amounting to nearly 55
47
percent of the total. This high proportion of government sales
means that these firms' total sales, and indirectly their profits
and overall financial health, are very sensitive to changes in
the amount of DOD weapons purchases. A somewhat more informative
picture of this dependence emerges when total sales figures are
broken down between government sales and commercial sales on a
company-by-company basis. This is done below in Table 4.
Including sales of aircraft and other items to foreign govern-
ments among 'commercial sales' - in accordance with an accounting
convention adopted throughout the industry - yields the percentages
48
of government sales in consolidated net sales shown in column six.
These percentages range from a low of 38 percent in the case of Boeing
and Rockwell to a high of 88 percent in the case of Vought Corp. , with
seven of the nine firms deriving more than half their revenue from
government sales. The main reason Boeing has such a low percentage
of government sales is its relatively high proportion - 60 percent -
of sales of commercial aircraft. At the opposite end of the aircraft
sales spectrum, Grumman Corp. derived 77 percent of its total revenue
from sales of aircraft to the government.
The dependence of these firm's total sales on government sales,
in general, and on sales of aircraft to the government, in partic-
ular, means that changes in the DOD budget can have a significant
49
impact on the sales and levels of employment of these firms. It
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process, these firms carefully prepare environmental forecasts that
provide the planning staff with an assessment of the likely politi-
cal and military environment and what defense policy and military
hardware needs are likely to be in such an environment, as far as
five to 10 years into the future.
An aerospace company's dependence on government sales, partic-
ularly if a large percentage of its sales are derived from a single
contract, may subject the firm to a significant termination risk,
since the government may terminate a contract for its convenience
at any time. This risk and the other risks involved in doing
business with the government are discussed in the next subsection.
6. Doing Business with the Government: Risks and Regulations
The recently completed Department of Defense Profit Policy
Study (nicknamed Profit '76), which entailed an analysis of defense
industry risks and profitability and which led to important re-
visions in DOD procurement policy, once again raised the question
of whether the profits contractors earn on government work are com-
mensurate with the risks they must bear in performing such work.
As the Profit '76 study and several earlier studies have noted,
working under contract for the government involves certain risks not
present in commercial dealings, and the scale of these risks is de-
52
pendent on the type of contract awarded.
It is not the purpose of this subsection to attempt to determine
whether defense work is of a relatively high risk/low return nature.
That issue has been debated - often heatedly - many times in the
53
past, and, in the opinion of this writer, the debate is likely to
29
continue well into the future as DOD procurement policy changes
and as each side reassesses the relative risks and rewards of
54
government business. One of the complicating factors in the
debate is the nonquantif iability of risk. Many studies have
listed the risk elements in government contracting, but be-
yond that, it is very difficult to do more than adopt some sur-
rogate measure - the Profit '76 study employed as a surrogate mea-
sure of risk the standard deviation of the firm's rate of return
over a ten-year period. Lack of agreement as to the most
appropriate measure of risk will, to the extent that different
measures lead to different conclusions, help keep the debate alive.
Whether government regulations permit profits sufficient to
compensate defense contractors for the risks they face is also
important from a planning standpoint. A firm will be willing to
invest its own funds in new plant and equipment only if the ex-
pected returns from the investment, when adjusted for risk, are
judged by top management to be adequate from the standpoint of
the firm and its shareholders. If potential returns are felt to
be inadequate, then top management will instead allocate the firm's
available investment capital to commercial projects.
The remainder of this subsection examines the buyer-seller
relationship that exists between the federal government and its
prime contractors - a relationship that is conditioned largely
by the procurement policies that have been established by the
government. The latter part of the subsection discusses how
the government's procurement policies - and, in particular, the
30
type of contract it is willing to award - can affect the allocation
of risk between buyer and seller. Unlike the studies of risk cited
earlier, which either catalogued a long list of risks or else con-
centrated on developing a single overall measure of risk, this sub-
section develops a set of risk classifications and clearly distin-
guishes (for any particular program) between those risk elements
associated with the period prior to the award of the first production
contract and those risk elements associated with the period following
the award of the first production contract. In the opinion of this
writer, such a distinction has important implications for corporate
planners and top managers who must carefully weigh expected returns
and risks before deciding how best to allocate the firm's scarce
engineering, scientific, and managerial talent among current and
proposed programs.
a. The Buyer-Seller Relationship
Government contracts are awarded and administered under a detailed
set of rules spelled out in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation
(ASPR) , an imposing collection of volumes that totals more than 3000
58
pages. The provisions of ASPR, together with thousands of addi-
tional directives and instructions, detail the conditions that must
be met when the contract between buyer and seller, which specifies
the obligations of both parties under the procurement agreement, is
written. Such an agreement is necessitated by the fact that the
procurement of weapons systems does not - indeed, can not - take place
via normal commercial market transactions. In commercial markets
firms design and develop new products entirely on their own and
31
finance research and development and initial production prior to
observing the actual demand for the good. Due to several factors,
among them national security considerations, the high cost and
long lead time required to develop new aircraft, and all the un-
. . , , . . . .
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. .
certainties connected with weapons system acquisition, it is
not in the best interests of the government to rely on this pro-
60
cess for obtaining major weapons systems. The government
needs some assurance that it will get what it needs when it needs
it and at a reasonable price, and the contractor needs some as-
surance that the government has a need for the new aircraft it is
developing, as well as financial support during the lengthy and
costly research and development process. Thus, there is the need
for negotiation and contractual relationships to supplant the mar-
ket place in determining product design, price, etc.
In discussing the buyer-seller relationship that exists be-
tween the government and the airframe builders, it is important to
distinguish, for any particular program, between the period prior
to the award of the initial production contract and the period
following that award. The contracting process for a new type of
aircraft begins with a Request for Proposals, which the government
issues to interested bidders. These contain detailed specifications
of the government's requirements. At this stage of the process,
and continuing through the building of prototypes for a fly off,
there are two or more sellers but only one buyer . The buyer-
seller relationship is what economists call a 'monopsony' - two
or more sellers competing against one another to sell their output
32
to the sole buyer. In such an environment there is a danger
that a contractor will submit an unrealistically low bid or an
unrealistically optimistic set of technical specifications in
order to increase its probability of winning. This danger in-
creases when there are not enough major contracts to go around,
and increases even further when the procuring agency resorts to
auctioning - i.e. asking contractors whose bids fall within the
competitive range for "best and final" offers. During this
portion of the contracting process the main risks the contractor
faces are those associated with either losing the competition or
else winning the competition but finding it impossible to meet
the terms of the contract.
Once the aircraft has gone into production, however, the
buyer-seller relationship changes dramatically. The existence
of the learning curve precludes further competition among air-
frame builders, and the government-contractor relationship becomes
one of 'monopsony' - a single buyer and a single seller. Pro-
duction contracts are typically renegotiated on a yearly basis.
But once the plane has gone into production, there no longer re-
main any technical uncertainties. Moreover, the shape of the
learning curve is known well enough that labor costs can be es-
66
timated fairly accurately, at least over the next year. Though
the cost of components purchased from subcontractors can change,
the degree of risk associated with cost increases that diminish
net income is relatively small. However, there is always a risk
that the government will terminate the contract at its convenience,
reimbursing the contractor for costs incurred up to the termination
33
date and paying it a pro rata share of the previously negotiated
fee, but leaving it on its own to decide what to do with facilities
and a labor force for which there is no longer any need. The im-
portance of the termination risk is difficult to assess, but, in the
opinion of this writer, is likely to be small in relation to the
risks associated with not winning the contract in the first place.
After the contractor has performed the work required under the
contract and been paid, any profits it may have earned are subject
67
to scrutiny by the Renegotiation Board. The board averages con-
tractor performance on all contracts on a yearly basis, and if it
determines that during the year under review the contractor earned
'excessive' profits, it recaptures the 'excess' for the government.
This review process is, however, a one-way street because the con-
tractor has no recourse in the event it believes its profits were
68
too low that year. Moreover, the determination of the reason-
ableness of each contractor's profits is made on the basis of a
69
set of six criteria that are widely regarded as vague and sub-
jective. Government contractors and independent analysts
have criticized the Renegotiation Board's decisions as arbitrary.
Kaysen and others believe that the way the government does business,
and in particular, the operation of the Renegotiation Board, dulls
whatever incentives exist in individual contracts for promoting
effxcient contractor performance.
This subsection has mentioned several of the risks involved in
government contracting. The next subsection examines these and
other associated risks.
34
b. Financial Risks and Business Risks
The term 'risk' is one that is subject to varying interpreta-
7 3tions. Some authors treat uncertainty' as a synonym for 'risk',
74
while others follow Knight and distinguish 'uncertainty'
, which
is held to be 'elusive and nonmeasurable' , from 'risk' which is
held to be measurable. Financial and business writers often
use the term 'risk' in an all-inclusive manner to encompass all
the assorted uncertainties, most of which are not susceptible to
measurement, that confront a firm, while financial management text-
books normally aim for a higher degree of precision, often carefully
distinguishing between 'business risk' , measured, say, as the co-
efficient of variation of the firm's net operating income, and 'fi-
nancial risk', measured, say, as the coefficient of variation of the
firm's net income (or earnings available to shareholders) or as the
7 ft
probability of bankruptcy. Studies dealing with the specific
subject of risk elements in government contracting tend to drift to
either of two extremes: either providing a long list of sources of
uncertainty or else selecting some single overall measure or risk.
One exception is a recent publication of the Aerospace Industries
79
Association of America that categorizes risks that confront aero-
space firms into four broad classes. A similar approach is adopted
in the first portion of this subsection, although the categories
differ somewhat and, in contrast to the earlier approach, a surrogate
measure of each of the risks in each category is suggested.
The major types of risk that are encountered by the nine major
military airframe builders are discussed below. Many of these risks,
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as indicated below, are those that affect all government contrac-
tors. In what follows a distinction is drawn between financial
risks and business risks ^ but as the discussion makes clear, gov-
ernment contracting affects both types of risk.
As discussed above, financial risk, which must be borne to
some extent by all corporations, encompasses the risk of bank-
ruptcy and the variability in the firm's net income. Surrogate
measures for these two components of financial risk are the prob-
ability of bankruptcy and the coefficient of variation of net in-
80
come, respectively. The probability of bankruptcy is, of
course, the ultimate risk that any business organization faces,
but, in the case of the major airframe builders, this risk is,
according to at least one expert, almost insignificant. Kurth
has offered empirical evidence in support of his belief in a
'bail-out imperative' that prompts the government to come up with
a new program and award it to a prime contractor in deep financial
8
1
trouble. Kurth would undoubtedly argue that the Navy's modi-
fication of the F-14 contract and the government's loan guarantee
for Lockheed were merely different manifestations of the same
8?
phenomenon. The second component of financial risk is also
affected by the way the government does business. For example,
Fairchild Industries, Inc., reported to its shareholders that
"the transition from the development to the production contract




What distinguishes financial risks from business risks is that
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only the former reflects the impact of the firm's financial
decisions, and in particular, what proportion of the firm's
capital has been raised through the issuance of debt instruments.
Both financial risk, as defined above, and business risk, as
defined below, reflect the impact of the operating decisions of
the firm. In this sense, then, financial risk is the more in-
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elusive term and can be thought of as the firm's overall risk.
Business risks are of six types: (i) technical risks, (ii)
bidding risks, (iii) production risks, (iv) cost risks, (v) gov-
ernment dependence risks, and (vi) commercial market risks. Each
of these is discussed below.
Technical risks are those associated with pushing the state
Q C
of the art each time a new military aircraft is developed.
Often there are several unknowns to be dealt with, and even if
the firm is confident it can solve each technical problem individu-
ally, there may remain much uncertainty concerning the time and
cost required to accomplish these results and there may also be
uncertainty as to how well the new integrated system incorporating
all these advances will perform. Since aerospace firms typically
earn a greater portion of their sales revenue on research and de-
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velopment work than do firms in other industries, this source of
uncertainty is of somewhat greater significance in the aerospace
industry. However, in view of DOD's apparent increasing willing-
ness to fund research and development on a cost-plus basis, the
impact of technical risks on the firm is correspondingly reduced.
One way to measure these risks, while reflecting the importance
37
of government funding, is to estimate the firm's probability of
failure to meet the contract's specifications. Since increasing
the government's share of the costs makes it less costly for the
firm to engage in an additional dollar's worth of research and de-
velopment, as long as the additional dollar is spent productively,
the probability of failure will tend to fall. Reducing this prob-
ability is in the firm's interest because failure to meet the con-
tract specifications may result, not only in financial loss, but
in loss of reputation as well.
The second category of business risk, bidding risk, is also
associated primarily (although not exclusively) with government
contracting. Prior to the award of a contract, the firms that in-
tend to bid spend money, some of it their own and the rest of it
the government's bid and proposal (B&P) money, preparing the bid.
As in the case of technical risks, government funding helps reduce
the impact of these risks. Also similar to technical risks, the
measurement of bidding risk may be carried out by once again esti-
mating the probability of failure, in this case, the probability of
failing to win the contract.
The third class of business risk, production risk, is associ-
ated with fluctuations in the levels of demand for the firm's prod-
uct that lead to volatility in manpower requirements. One major
source of fluctuation in demand for military aircraft is the rapid
buildup and the rapid phasing out that accompany the start and
89
completion, respectively, of a major government contract. Such
fluctuations may force the firm through successive periods of
38
layoffs and rehirings, both of which involve substantial direct and
indirect costs. For example, where labor unions exist, one would
90expect on the basis of economic theory ' that unions would press
for higher wages in order to obtain for their workers a risk premi-
um to compensate them for the risk of being laid off. A more
serious problem from the company's standpoint is the threat of not
being able to rehire previously laid off skilled scientific or
engineering talent or skilled line managers because they were hired
by other firms, or worse yet, because they left the industry. Any
measure of the volatility of aerospace employment, such as the co-
efficient of variation of the number of employee-hours per week over
some specified time period, might serve as a measure of this type of
risk.
The fourth category of business risk, cost risk, involves the
contractor's possible failure to produce the item within target cost.
This category of risk overlaps with technical risk, since the greater
is the technical complexity of the item - i.e. the greater are the
technical risks - the greater is the risk that actual costs will
exceed target cost. As discussed below, when research and develop-
ment contracts are of the cost-plus form, the government assumes
most of the cost risk. On production contracts, on which the tech-
nical risks are normally much smaller than on research and develop-
ment contracts, but on which the government normally insists on a
fixed price, there is also cost risk. This risk is induced by such
factors as production delays, design changes ordered by the govern-
ment that lead to cost increases that are not fully reimbursed, and
increases in the cost of inputs due to general inflation that are
39
not fully covered in the contract. Also, as discussed below, the
use of fixed-price contracts for the production phase of a major
program forces a larger share of the cost risk to fall on the con-
91
tractor. As far as the measurement problem is concerned, cost
risk on any contract or project could be measured either by the
standard deviation of the probability distribution of actual cost
about target cost - estimated, say, on the basis of historical
data - or more simply, as the estimated probability that target
cost will be exceeded.
Two other aspects of cost risk should be noted. First, to re-
duce bid risk the contractor may submit an unrealistically low bid,
thereby increasing its cost risk. Second, the use of subcontractors
92
can also have an impact on cost risk in two offsetting ways. On
the one hand, the greater use of subcontractors relaxes the prime
contractor's direct control over those phases of research and devel-
opment and/or production that have been contracted out, while on
the other hand, a portion of the prime contractor's overall cost
risk can be transferred to the subcontractor if the latter accepts
93
the work on fixed-price basis.
The fifth category of business risk, government dependence risk,
also overlaps with the other categories of business risk. Govern-
ment dependence risk is caused by a contractor's having to sell
high technology military aircraft to (or at least through) a single
buyer. This imposes certain risks in research and development work
because the government must be satisfied with the product before it
will authorize production, and in addition, because the contracting
authority may alter its requirements as the weapons system evolves,
40
ordering the contractor to modify components, which in turn may have
a ripple effect on other components in the system. A second aspect of
government dependence risk is the volatility of government funding,
which can have a strong impact on a contractor's production risk. The
fall in DOD spending following the Vietnam war peak is one of the main
factors responsible for the current overcapacity in the aerospace
94
industry. In addition, each of the above factors can also com-
pound cost risk. A third aspect of government dependence risk is
termination risk - the probability that the government may terminate
a contract for convenience. Such termination may be due to a lack
of funding, or to political pressures such as those threatening the
Bl bomber program, or more simply, to altered priorities. In any
case, the very limited possibilities for, and the very high cost
in terms of direct outlays and loss of efficiency of, converting the
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production facilities to some alternative use mean that layoffs
follow, the contractor's business base and earnings shrink, and the
amount of unused capacity increases. A fourth aspect of government
dependence risk is that associated with the present very real pos-
sibility that, even if real defense spending continues to increase,
the number of major contracts, and hence, the number of airframe
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builders needed to serve as prime contractors, may diminish.
As far as measurement of government dependence risk is concerned,
one might adopt some measure of the volatility of a contractor's
government sales, as, for example, the standard deviation of gov-
ernment sales (about a trend) over some specified period.
The last category of risks includes those risks that are strict-
ly commercial, and as such, can be interpreted and measured in the
41
same manner as Van Home's business risks. In the case of the three
firms producing commercial passenger aircraft, however, it may be
more meaningful to attach risks to specific programs. These are of
essentially two types: the risk (i.e. the probability) of not
reaching the break-even number of units sold for a particular type
of aircraft and the risk (i.e. the probability) of a disastrous
accident that will tarnish the company's image and might thereby de-
tract from future sales. The first of these also reflects the risks
associated with mistiming the introduction of a new commercial aircraft,
One method of dealing with these substantial financial and busi-
ness risks is for the airframe builders to cooperate through joint
98
ventures. This approach is superior from the standpoint of the
firms involved to the more traditional prime contractor - subcontrac-
tor form of business relationship in that research and development
are shared more equally and each producer shares in the production
and marketing of the aircraft. Hence, in a joint venture each pro-
99ducer is a prime contractor, and as will be argued below, it is
prime contracting rather than subcontracting, and the prestige that
accompanies the successful development and production of a new high
technology aircraft that is one of the primary sources of satisfaction
for the managers of these firms.
c. The Government - Airframe Contractor Relations:
Allocation of Risks by Contract Type
Having indicated the major sources of risk, the discussion will
deal next with the question of risk-sharing between the government
and the contractor. At one extreme, the government could provide
all the fixed capital (i.e. plant and equipment) and all the working
42
97
capital (i.e. short term funding for inventories and work in
process) and pay the airframe contractor a fixed fee for managing
these assets. In this case the government would assume the larger
share of business risk. At the opposite extreme, the contractor
could provide all its own fixed and working capital and according-
ly assume all the business risk. In reality, the government does
furnish some fixed capital, L although it appears to be trying
102to phase out its plant ownership role in the aerospace industry.
The government also funds a large portion of the major airframe
builders' working capital requirements by providing progress pay-
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ments, though with interest now an allowable cost, the extent
of government funding of working capital requirements may decrease.
One of the most important mechanisms by which the government
is able to shift risk between itself and the airframe builder is
by its selection of the type of contract for a particular procure-
ment. Several studies have examined the relationship between
contract type, the extent of the risks borne by the contractor,
and contractor performance. Procurement contracts are of four
basic types: firm-fixed-price (FFP) , fixed-price-incentive (FPI)
,
cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) , and cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF)
.
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As implied by the fee ranges set by the Department of Defense,
the government's share of overall risk (and, in particular, its
share of cost risk) is greatest under CPFF contracts, somewhat less
under CPIF contracts, less yet under FPI contracts, and least under
FFP contracts. Correspondingly, the contractor's share of the risk




A third mechanism by which risk is shifted is via government
contract provisions regarding warranties. The purpose of a
warranty is to protect the buyer in the event the item turns out
to be defective. The warranty typically specifies the extent of
the producer's liability for repairing or replacing defective
items. Several comparisons of government contract provisions
regarding warranties with commercial warranties have shown govern-
ment warranties, in general, to be more demanding. The ex-
istence of more stringent warranties has the effect of increasing
the share of technical risk, and hence the share of overall financial
risk, borne by the firm, since ceteris paribus the more exacting are
the standards, the greater is the likelihood they cannot be met, and
consequently, the greater is the likelihood the contractor will suf-
fer some sort of financial penalty.
This subsection has examined the government-airframe contrac-
tor relationship and has discussed the major risks airframe contrac-
tors face and how government procurement policy affects the sharing
of these risks with its prime contractors. The next subsection
looks at the commercial side of the airframe builders' business,
and in particular, at their attempts to diversify in order to re-
duce their dependence on government sales.
7. Diversification: Balancing Government Business and
Commercial Business
The previous subsection discussed some of the major differences
between the buyer-seller relationship that exists between the gov-
ernment and a prime contractor and the buyer-seller relationship
44
that is typical of commercial markets. The subsection went on
to point out the risks associated with this special relationship,
and in particular, the risks a contractor faces as it becomes
increasingly dependent on government sales. While commercial
ventures also pose certain risks, some of which are of great
magnitude, many of the major airframe builders have increased
their efforts to diversify into non-aerospace commercial ventures
112
in recent years.
One reason offered to explain this desire to diversify is
the relatively low profitability and the relatively high risks of
government business. A second reason is the limited growth po-
tential provided by government sales during recent years as real
defense spending fell. Table 5 summarizes the recent profitability
and growth experience of the nine major military airframe builders.
As the table, shows, the median profitability, whether measured
by the average return on equity or the average return on total cap-
ital, as well as the median net profit margin and the average annual
sales growth, for the nine firms were below the respective median
values both for the aerospace industry as a whole ( 'industry median' )
113
and for all industries taken collectively ('all industries median).
If one views a corporation as a business entity that exists primarily
for the benefit of its shareholders, then, of the three indicators
of profitability shown in Table 5, average return on equity is the
most appropriate. Therefore, on the basis of this measure and the
114
profitability figures provided, one must conclude that whatever
differences exist between the profitability of the major airframe
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in other industries are not significant. It is equally clear
from the figures provided in Table 5 that the major airframe
builders have grown more slowly than other firms. Moreover,
Rockwell International, which grew the fastest, was also the most
active in acquiring other firms outside the aerospace industry.
One direction in which the major military airframe builders
might choose to diversify is the production of commercial jet air-
craft. Indeed, three of the nine already dominate the world market.
The technological complementarity of military and commercial air-
craft would tend to make such diversification appear attractive.
Also, the character of the production processes is similar enough
that managerial and productive expertise could also be transferred
rather easily - certainly more easily than to, say, automobiles or
food products. However, the demand for commercial aircraft is
highly cyclical and, despite the evident need for new jetliners,
the present outlook for commercial jet aircraft sales is clouded
120
by the severe financial problems afflicting the nation's airlines
and the apparent peaking out of the growth of airline passenger
121
traffic. Moreover, the financial risks are enormous, with out-
lays for research and development and initial production amounting
to as much as $2 billion before the producer begins to recover its
122
investment. The recent entry of foreign producers, supported
by the vast financial resources of their governments, has greatly
123
increased the competitive pressures faced by U.S. firms.
Thus, the opportunities for diversification in this direction are,
in the opinion of this writer, virtually nonexistent.
48
Diversification into commercial non-aircraft product lines has
also been carried out, and the major airframe builders have gener-
ally been more successful in those ventures than involve the trans-
ference of the technological expertise developed in their aerospace
124
operations. However, as Table 6 indicates, these commercial
non-aircraft ventures have, in four cases, recently acted as a net
125drain on corporate net earnings. Admittedly, some of these
losses are due to the recent recession, rather than to the firm's
basic inability to develop profitable commercial non-aircraft lines
of business. However, the fact remains that the managerial skills
required to oversee an organization that develops and produces a
relatively small number of high technology products that it markets
to only a small number of select customers are different from those
required to mass produce and to market on a wide scale consumer-
oriented goods and services. As a result, in trying to diversify
into commercial non-aircraft ventures, the major military airframe
126
builders have to be very careful where they invest their money,
and as the experience of Rockwell International would seem to indi-
cate, diversification by external means (i.e. by taking over es-
tablished firms) is preferable to diversification by internal means,
since the former approach brings experienced managers into the firm
127
and brings an established marketing network under its control.
More seriously, the limited opportunities for profitable diversifi-
cation, when coupled with the relative inflexibility of the plant
and equipment these firms operate, may have the effect of forcing
these firms to accept (what they may regard as) subnormal profits
without recourse to the avenue of relief open to firms in tradi-
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In the course of interviews with executives of the major
military airframe builders, the author was told that these
firms would like to diversify into new product lines in order
129
to reduce their dependence on the government. These firms
generally view government business as relatively risky and
relatively less profitable than commercial business, and they
see diversification as one way to reduce the overall risks
130
they face. Yet, as this subsection has tried to point out,
diversification into commercial markets poses special problems
for many of these firms. It is not surprising, then, that many
of them have also pursued a different approach to risk reduction,
namely, the expansion of foreign markets for their goods and the
development of cooperative ventures with foreign producers. These
developments are discussed in the next subsection.
8. Foreign Sales and Foreign Competition
As sales of military aircraft to the U.S. government fell
following the Vietnam war and as domestic sales of commercial air-
craft fell during the recent recession, one of the factors that
helped sustain the U.S. aerospace industry was foreign sales of
military aircraft. During 1975, for example, foreign sales of
military aircraft and other aerospace products amounted to $2.5
131
billion and accounted for 350,000 jobs and for seven percent
132
of U.S. exports. As domestic opportunities diminish, the
133
major airframe builders have tried to expand foreign sales.
134
Such sales can, however, lead to political difficulties since,
even if the sales are made by the manufacturer directly to the
52
foreign government, they must be reviewed by various U.S. gov-
135
ernment agencies. In addition, the foreign buyer may insist
on certain conditions, such as the sharing of production with
136
one or more firms in that country or a guaranteed purchase
1 37by U.S. buyers of a certain amount of that country's exports,
as part of the deal.
In addition to the difficulties associated with having to
make various concessions to foreign governments in order to sell
airplanes, the U.S. airframe builders are meeting with increased
competition from foreign builders of both commercial and military
aircraft. Most of these foreign competitiors are supported fi-
1 'ifi
nancially by their governments. Since many of the foreign
commercial airlines are government -owned , the foreign government
139
can direct its airline to buy domestically produced aircraft.
A third factor making for increased foreign competition is the
multinational pooling of efforts, which permits the sharing of
140
heavy development costs and which can also serve to expand
141
the 'guaranteed market' for a particular foreign aircraft.
These factors place the major U.S. airframe builders at a
disadvantage, and in order to counter the risk of erosion of
their foreign markets, several U.S. firms have recently entered
•
,. r ..142into joint ventures with foreign aerospace firms.
9 . Summary
This section has provided an overview of the nine major
military airframe builders in the United States. The discussion
53
has focused not only on the firms themselves, but also on the
environment within which they operate, and in particular, on
their relationship with their principal customer, the United
States government, on the financial and business risks they
must bear, and also on the increasing foreign pressures they
face. With the material presented in this section as a back-
ground, the remainder of the paper describes how these firms
conduct their long term and short term planning.
C. BACKGROUND TO THE PLANNING PROCESS; THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FIRM
1. The Planning Process
In light of the many risks associated with the aerospace
business that were discussed in the previous section, as well as
the apparent reduction in the number of major military aircraft
programs and the intensifying foreign competition for both mili-
tary and commercial aircraft sales, the following maxim culled
from the office wall of an aerospace planning executive seems to
this writer an appropriate way to begin this section:
"The company that doesn't plan for its future isn't likely
to have one."
The overall purpose of the corporate and divisional planning
conducted by the major airframe builders may be stated succinctly
as follows: to allocate the company's scarce productive resources -
manpower, facilities, and skilled managerial, engineering, and
technical talent - and its scarce financial resources among existing
and potential commercial product lines and among existing and
54
potential government contracts in accordance with goals and objec-
tives of the company. The 'existing' in the above statement re-
fers mainly to short term, or operational
->
planning , with its em-
phasis on the firm's most efficient use of its current stocks of
capital resources - both physical capital in the form of plant
and equipment and human capital in the form of the knowledge and
skills embodied in the firm's managers, engineers, and scientists -
and its emphasis on carrying out production to meet current commit-
ments in the most efficient manner - in terms of minimizing pro-
duction costs while maintaining product quality and contract per-
formance (in an attempt to generate maximum sustainable earnings).




with its emphasis on new business - and
the most effective use of research and development funds, engineers,
and scientists in order to develop the expertise necessary to de-
velop new products and secure new government contracts - and its
emphasis on the most efficient use of the firm's financial resources
to purchase new production facilities and new equipment and to start
up or acquire new businesses.
Planning, then, takes place on two levels: short term planning,
for which the time period involved is typically one year, although
some of the major airframe builders carry out operational planning
over longer periods, and long term planning, for which the time
period involved is typically five years, although some of the major
airframe builders carry out strategic planning over longer periods.
As described below, consistency between the long term plan and the
short term plan is achieved by first formulating the long term
55
plan and then using the first year of the long plan (or the first
two years or five years if that is the firm's short term planning
period) as the basis for the short term plan.
At both the strategic and the operational levels, planning is
done iteratively. The nine major airframe builders are organized
as multidivision companies, with one or more divisions producing
144
aircraft and other aerospace products and several divisions
145producing non-aerospace products, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Decision-making and much of the responsibility for planning are
decentralized, although major decisions, such as those requiring
capital investment, and strategic and operational plans must be
cleared with the company's headquarters, which maintains its own
planning staff - sometimes consisting of just one individual -
and which ensures that the plans of the various divisions, when
amalgamated, are consistent with the company's goals and objectives.
Achieving this consistency may require several iterations between
division and headquarters until the latter is satisfied with the
former's plans.
The headquarters planning staff has an additional responsibility
that is critical to the planning process. The corporate planning
staff prepares annually an environmental forecast, which, as the
name implies, characterizes the firm's operating environment over
a period of years at least as long as the strategic planning period.
Each division inputs information relating to its own area of exper-
tise to the corporate planning staff, which gathers additional in-







































lines of operating authority
lines of planning authority
Figure 2: The Headquarters-Division Planning Relationship
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in future years, the future political environment and its likely
impact on future defense budgets, etc., and prepares the final
document (s). No claim is made as to the perfect accuracy of these
projections, but rather, the environmental forecast is intended
as a summary statement by the company of what it regards as rea-
sonable assessments of future conditons likely to have an impact
on the demand for the company's products - i.e. assessments on
which the corporate planning staff would expect the divisions to
base their strategic and operational plans.
The preparation and use of the environmental forecast are
discussed in greater detail below, where section D focuses on
the forecast itself and sections E and F discuss long term plan-
ning and short term planning, respectively, for which the environ-
mental forecast provides important input data. The remainder of
this section concentrates on the objectives of the firm, which,
like the environmental forecast, underlie the planning process.
2. The Objectives of the Firm
Though a company's objectives may not be stated explicitly
at the outset of the planning cycle, the acceptance or rejection
of divisional objectives and plans is based to a large extent on
how well these objectives and plans support the company's objectives.
Indeed, the divisional long term and short term plans finally ac-
cepted by headquarters and the specific goals they contain - a sales
or output goal, a profit goal, etc. - are a reflection of corporate
objectives. This subsection discusses the broad objectives of
the nine major military airframe builders. While recognizing that
58
all corporations do not share identical goals, the author believes
that there is sufficient commonality among the nine firms as to
broad objectives to warrant the general treatment undertaken here.
Before describing the objectives of these firms, it will help
to make that discussion more meaningful if the sources of the
firms' objectives are discussed first. According to the traditional
146
theories of the firm, the objective of the firm is that of its
shareholders, and the firm acts so as to maximize shareholder util-
ity, which, under the appropriate assumptions, reduces to maximiz-
ing the stock market value of the firm's equity. According to an
147
alternative point of view, as expressed by the managerial theories,
the objectives of the firm are set by top management, and profit-
ability or the stock market value of equity affect managers only as
constraints on their discretion to pursue alternative objectives.
148
According to a third point of view, that of the behavioralists
,
the firm's objectives are established through an internal bargain-
ing process that takes place among the various special interest
groups, for example, the labor force, the marketing staff, technical
staff, shareholders, top management, middle management, etc., that
compromise the firm and its 'owners' .
Based on personal interviews with executives of the nine firms,
it is the belief of this writer that none of the three views dis-
cussed in the preceding paragraph is entirely correct. Rather, it
is the author's view that the objectives of each firm are set by
top management, principally the president and the chairman of the
board of directors, together with the other members of the board
149
of directors. It is up to top management to weigh the specific
59
objectives of the various special interest groups, to resolve any
conflicts that might arise, and to ensure compliance on the part
of these groups with regard to the firm's established objectives.
In particular, it is the board of directors, which includes rep-
resentatives of shareholders and top management, rather than the
shareholders themselves, that sets the firm's dividend policy and
that also makes the major financial and investment decisions that
affect the firm's future ability to pay dividends. It is also
the board of directors that sets the compensation levels for top
management. Of course, the relative weights assigned to a partic-
ular set of objectives could vary considerably from one firm to
another, depending, for example, on the degree of influence of one
or more key shareholders, and could also vary over time for
any one firm. Yet, the role of top management in establishing
objectives would imply that, to the extent that the objectives of
managers conflict with those of shareholders, shareholders' goals
are not likely to be followed exclusively (in contrast to what the
traditional theories have implied) , and the role of the key share-
holders in establishing the objectives of the firm would also imply
that managers' goals are not likely to be followed exclusively
either (in contrast to what the managerial theories have implied).
Moreover, in establishing objectives, top management and other
directors can take into account the desires of the various special
interest groups within the firm, as suggested in the behavioralist
approach, but in a manner suggestive of greater consistency in over-
151
all objectives over time than the behavioralists have implied.
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Broadly, the objectives of the nine major military airframe
builders, as interpreted by this writer, fall into five classes:
(i) sales objectives; (ii) a profit, or earnings, objective;
(iii) a product quality, or in the case of weapons systems, weap-
ons system performance, objective; (iv) a backlog, or new busi-
ness, objective; and (v) a managerial emoluments objective. The
first class consists of multiple objectives in order to reflect
managements' desire to balance government and commercial business,
while the other four classes consist of a single objective each.
The remainder of this section is devoted to a discussion of these
five classes of objectives.
The sales objectives reflect top managements' interest in
size and diversification. In a model of the typical DOD airframe
contractor to be developed in a subsequent paper, four sales objec-
tives will be specified, one each for sales of aircraft and re-
lated parts and equipment to the government, sales of other prod-
ucts to the government, sales of aircraft and related parts and
equipment to commercial buyers, and sales of other commercial goods.
Alternatively, given the initial levels of these quantities, the
four objectives could be restated in equivalent form as growth
objectives. The reason for stating four sales objectives, rather
than merely having two - one for government sales and one for com-
mercial sales - or one - combining all sales figures into a single
measure - is so that diversification between aircraft and non-
aircraft products, as well as diversification between government
and non-government sales, can be represented. As discussed in the
previous section, several of the nine firms have in recent years
61
tried to develop new commercial non-aerospace ventures and two
of the nine, LTV and Rockwell, are already widely diversified
away from government sales and away from aircraft sales. In
addition, all have some non-aircraft sales to the government -
chiefly missiles and space equipment or ships. They are inter-
ested in diversifying in the two general directions mentioned
above, though as David Lewis, Chairman of General Dynamics, re-
cently made very clear, these firms are going to continue to
152
actively seek government contracts to produce military aircraft,
and diversification is going to take place through the expansion
of sales in commercial and non-aircraft ventures and not through
the intentional contraction of their airframe business. It is
felt by this writer that the value of increased sales in each of
the four product areas as well as the importance of relative in-
creases in non-government and non-aircraft sales - i.e. diversi-
fication - are best captured by stating multiple sales objectives.
The second objective, which relates to profits, is important
for at least two reasons. Profits serve as an index of the effi-
ciency with which management employs the firm's assets. Also,
profits serve an important financial function. They represent
the surplus of revenue over costs that may be used to pay divi-
dends, and thereby satisfy the owners of the firm's equity shares,
and, after dividends have been paid, the remainder represents re-
tained earnings that may be used to finance new investment in
plant and equipment or to acquire other firms.
The third objective, maintaining high product quality and
62
strong weapons system performance, is highly important to the
managers of these firms, many of whom have engineering backgrounds
and many of whose families, for example, the McDonnells and the
Rockwells, have been in the aerospace business for generations.
Product quality is so important also because each firm's managers
want their company's name associated with technical excellence.
Not only does such a reputation help foster a favorable public
attitude toward the firm, but it also helps the company main-
153
tain its position as a prime contractor and can contribute
154
to sales of its commercial products that bear the company's name.
More importantly, high product quality and strong weapons system
performance contribute to the firm's long run profitability.
The fourth objective, enlarging the business backlog, is par-
ticularly important in the case of aircraft sales, where production
lead times are normally several months or more and where a tempo-
rary shutting down of a production line could cost several million
dollars. A larger backlog provides some security and, as discussed
below in section E, pushes the firm's going-out-of-business curve
outward and makes the task of long term planning somewhat easier.
The last objective, managerial emoluments, reflects managements'
interest in its own level of compensation. This includes not only
salary, which is fully taxable, but also the perquisites, such as
stock options, the earnings on which are taxed at the lower capital
gains rate (provided, of course, the securities are held long enough
to qualify for special tax treatment), and expense accounts, company
cars, etc. , which are not taxable.
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In a later paper the four sales objectives and the nrofit,
product quality, backlog, and managerial emoluments objectives
will be used as arguments of a managerial utility function that
will constitute the objective function in the mathematical pro-
gramming formulation of the typical DOD airframe builder's plan-
ning problem. For the purposes of this descriptive paper, how-
ever, all these objectives will remain in the background. As
part of the long term and short term planning processes described
below, top management evaluates proposed projects in terms of the
five classes of objectives, and an important part of the two
planning processes is the formulation of divisional goals and ob-
jectives, which top management reviews carefully and which, once
approved by top management, are the focal point around which the
divisonal plans are structured.
D. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORECAST
1. The Corporate Planning Cycle
The corporate planning cycle for each of the nine major
military airframe builders consists of the following three pri-
mary phases: preparation of the environmental forecast, develop-
ment of the corporate long range plan, and specification of the
corporate operating plan. These phases occur sequentially and
1 c r
together they span the company's entire fiscal year. That is,
planning for fiscal year T and beyond takes place throughout
fiscal year T-l.
The primary phases of the corporate planning cycle are
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illustrated in Figure 3. Each company's fiscal year is divided
into four quarters. During the first quarter of year T-l the
environmental forecast is prepared. During the second and third
quarters of year T-l various long range planning studies are
carried out and reviewed, culminating in the company's long range
plan for years T and beyond. During the fourth quarter of year T-l
the operating plan for year T is established, essentially by speci-























Figure 3: The Corporate Planning Cycle
2. The Environmental Forecast: Its Purpose and Its Structure
The publication of the company's environmental forecast and
its distribution among the firm's operating divisions initiates
the planning cycle. The form and content of the environmental fore-
cast may vary from one company to another. In some cases the fore-
cast is a formal document that carefully analyzes and weighs political,
social, economic, and business factors that may in the future have an
impact on the firm. In other cases it is an informal paper prepared
by a small staff who gather information and supporting data from a
variety of public and private sources to highlight those significant
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factors likely to affect the firm in the future. In either case
the purpose of the environmental forecast is the same.
The purpose of the environmental forecast is, as its name
suggests, to summarize within a single document the company's
prognosis of the most likely external business environment
within which it can expect to operate over its long term planning
horizon. More importantly, the environmental forecast establishes
a common set of assumptions that, when used in the next two phases
of the planning cycle, give the plans of the individual operating
divisions a vital degree of consistency that would otherwise be
lacking.
The environmental forecast is written in conjunction with the
firm's operating divisions, each of which is asked to submit to
the corporate planning staff early in the first quarter informa-
tion within its area of expertise that is relevant to its planning
problem. Such a procedure has two main advantages. First, the
divisions are involved in the planning process very early in the
planning cycle and, since they provide much of the information on
which the environmental forecast is based, they are more likely to
view the environmental forecast's projections as reasonable than
they would if the projections had been developed by the corporate
planning staff without consultation. Second, the corporate plan-
ning staff can utilize the marketing expertise that is available
in the divisions, thus enabling them to spend more time on analy-
sis, rather than on data collection.
The structure of the environmental forecast varies from one
company to another, depending on the needs of divisional planners.
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Generally, the forecast treats three main subject areas. First,
it describes the international environment and how such factors
as international political tensions and international economic
trends are likely to affect world demand for military aircraft.
Second, it discusses the domestic political and economic envi-
ronment and projects the size of the defense budget over the long
term planning horizon. Of particular concern to the company is
how changes in the defense budget might affect the company's
current military programs as well as any future military programs
on which the company is planning to bid. Third, it discusses
factors relevant to the specific product markets, both military
and commercial, in which the company sells its goods. For example,
if the company produces commercial aircraft, such factors as the
expected future growth of airline passenger traffic, the expected
future growth of air cargo shipments, the expected future impact of
fuel price changes, and regulatory trends, would, to the extent that
meaningful projections can be made, give planners in the commercial
aircraft division a good planning base from which to work.
A useful by-product of the process leading to the environmental
forecast is a set of analyses, one for each operating division,
of the strengths and weaknesses of the company's operations. Each
such analysis assesses such factors as the strengths and weaknesses
of that division's products in relation to the products of the firm's
major competitors (in the case of commercial products) and problems
that might arise in connection with government contracts (in the case
of military weapons systems). The analysis of the division's
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strengths and weaknesses is used by the divisional planning staff
in conjunction with the environmental forecast that comes down
from the corporate planning staff near the end of the first quarter
to formulate the division's long term plan.
E. LONG TERM PLANNING: PORTFOLIO SELECTION AND THE
GOING- OUT- OF- BUSINESS CURVE
1. Introduction
The second phase of the corporate planning cycle consists
of long term planning. The purpose of long term, or strategic,
planning is to determine the corporation's business strategy over
the long term planning horizon - typically a period of five years'
duration. The long term planning process leads to a long term
plan for each of the firm's operating divisions that is consistent
with the corporation's goals and objectives and that spells out
that division's role - i.e. its business strategy - in meeting the
company's goals and objectives.
This section describes the long term planning process that is
followed within the nine major military airframe builders. At the
outset it should be noted that long term planning, as practiced by
these firms, is not designed to lead necessarily to an 'optimum'
plan. The planning process is an iterative one, as described be-
low, though the iterations are designed to achieve feasibility and
robustness rather than to ensure optimality. During the long term
planning process headquarters and the operating divisions search
for a long term plan - essentially a collection of business
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strategies together with the facilities, financial, research and
development, and manpower requirements needed to support them -
that is feasible in the sense of leading to the attainment of cor-
porate goals and objectives if the 'expected' environment (as de-
scribed in the environmental forecast) materializes and that is also
robust in the sense that the plan will also permit the firm's goals
and objectives to be attained if the business environment in general,
and market conditions in particular, should vary from what is
expected in a manner that top management perceives as reasonable.
The fact that these firms do not strive for a plan that is
optimal - in the sense that it leads to a higher level of managerial
utility, a higher stock market value of the firm's equity, or a
higher value of some other function or quantity than any other
feasible plan - is due to at least two factors, each of which was
mentioned by several of the executives interviewed by the author.
First, gathering the information required to formulate the long
term planning problem as an optimization problem, say as a mathe-
matical programming problem, would, in the opinions of virtually
all the executives interviewed, be prohibitively costly in terms
of time and money. Second, even if the problem could be formu-
lated in a manner acceptable to top management, a solution would
have to be obtained, and in the opinion of most of the executives
interviewed, the size and complexity of the problem would make it
prohibitively costly to find the solution. These cost
considerations would imply, if they are correct, that even though
the long term plans that are developed are not necessarily optimal,
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the planning process itself may be optimal - in the sense that,
of all the procedures available for achieving any particular set
of feasible and robust plans, it involves the least cost.
This question of the optimality of the planning process will be
explored further in a subsequent paper.
2. Long Term Planning at the Divisional Level
At approximately the same time the corporate planning staff
releases the environmental forecast - late in the first quarter or
early in the second quarter - top management distributes among the
company's operating divisions a statement of the corporation's long
term goals and objectives and a set of strategic guidelines. From
this point onward in the corporate planning cycle, the primary or-
ganizational responsibility for planning shifts from headquarters
to the operating divisions. The corporate planning staff continues
to be involved in the planning process, but its role involves co-
ordinating the planning efforts of the divisions, analyzing the
plans of the divisions, and amalgamating the plans of the divisions
for review by top management. The long term plans themselves are
prepared at the divisional level.
The long term planning process as carried out at the divisional
level is illustrated in Figure 4. The process begins with the
environmental forecast that establishes the projected future states
of the firm's operating environment and with the statement of cor-
porate goals and objectives and the set of strategic guidelines hand-
ed down by top management. The environmental forecast together with
the set of strategic guidelines specify the constraints imposed by
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Figure 4: The Divisional Long Term Planning Cycle
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top management, within which the division must develop its business
strategy.
An important part of the long term planning process is the prep-
aration of long term planning studies, most of which are carried
out at the divisional level. As indicated in Figure 4, the divi-
sional long term planning studies, which are initiated in the first
quarter, are the basis for the division's input to the environmental
forecast, which, in turn, is carefully considered by top management
when it formulates the corporation's goals and objectives and the
strategic guidelines. That is, the goals, objectives, and guidelines
do reflect what top management perceives as the firm's likely future
operating environment.
Even after the environmental forecast has been distributed, the
divisional long term planning studies continue. As indicated in
Figure 4, the later long term planning studies generally narrow in
focus, providing specific market analyses, e.g. the state of future
demand in specific product markets, and detailing the strengths and
weaknesses of the division vis-a-vis the division's major competi-
tors in each of its product markets.
Concomitant with the preparation of the planning studies is
the formulation of the division's goals and objectives. As indi-
cated in Figure 4, the two major inputs used by divisional man-
agers are the environmental forecast and top management's state-
ment of corporate goals and objectives. The divisional goals and
objectives are submitted to top management, which must approve
them before long term planning can proceed any further.
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After the divisional goals and objectives have been approved
and the division's long term marketing studies and its assess-
ment of its strengths and weaknesses have been completed, the
division's management prepares the division's long term business
strategy for achieving its goals and objectives, and by implica-
tion, for achieving the goals and objectives of the corporation.
The business strategy covers such items as product design, pricing
policy, development of new customer relationships, etc., for ex-
isting product lines as well as its strategies concerning new
product lines, i.e. in which direction(s) it intends to diversify,
what new product lines it intends to develop, when the new prod-
ucts should be introduced to the market place, for what upcoming
government programs it intends to bid, etc. From the divisional
business strategy flows sales estimates for existing product lines
and the new business plan.
Generally, the business strategy is developed and sales es-
timates are generated and the new business plan is formulated by
product line and by government contract. Often the corporation's
principal operating units will consist of several subdivisions
each, with each subdivision responsible for one or more individual





of the division - i.e. the principal operating unit - is to
integrate the various sales estimates provided by these subdivi-
sions with the new business plan for the division in order to
establish the following plans: (i) the technical plan, which
lists the technical requirements and the size of the technical
staff and the amount of funds needed to support the division's
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research and development effort; (ii) the manpower and produc-
tion plan, which lists planned output and the numbers and cost
of production and managerial personnel needed to meet these
targets; and (iii) the facilities plan, which lists the types
and amounts of plant and equipment needed and the costs of
maintaining existing facilities and investing in new facilities.
These three plans, together with sales estimates and the new
business plan, are used to generate the division's long term
financial plan.
Once completed, the financial plan, together with the new
business, technical, manpower and production, and facilities
plans, are submitted to the corporate planning staff, which
reviews the division's plans. If the corporate planning staff
is not satisfied, for example, because the plan contains in-
consistencies or because the division appears to have deviated
too far from the assumptions contained in the environmental
forecast, it sends the plan back to the division. If the cor-
porate planning staff accepts the plan, it then amalgamates
the plan with the plans of all the other operating divisions.
The amalgamated plans form the provisional corporate plan,
which is submitted to top management for its approval. Top
management reviews the provisional corporate plan as well as
summaries of the divisional plans and checks for consistency
with corporate goals and objectives. Specifically, top manage-
ment checks the provisional corporate plan for feasibility - i.e.
will the plan enable the corporation's goals and objectives
to be attained? - and for robustness - i.e. if the plan is
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carried out, but environmental conditions change from what
has been anticipated, how seriously will the corporation's
ability to meet its goals be impaired? Top management
is also likely to check for other desirable characteristics,
such as flexibility - i.e. is the plan sufficiently flexible
that certain actions can be postponed without having severe
consequences for other parts of the plan, or does the plan
call for substantial irreversible investments very early in
the planning period? If any of the divisional plans require
modification, they are returned to the division. As indi-
cated in Figure 4, the division will probably have to alter
its business strategy. Once the long term plan has been ac-
cepted by headquarters, the long term planning phase of the
corporate planning cycle has been completed.
The above description of the long term planning process
was intentionally kept general in order to give the reader
an intuitive feel for the overall process. The remainder
of this section looks at important aspects of this overall
process more closely.
3. Long Term Planning: Government Sales and the
Going-Out-Of-Business Curve
The description of the long term planning process
provided in the preceding subsection did not distinguish
between government sales and commercial sales. In Figure 4
government sales and commercial sales were lumped together
in the blocks labeled 'sales estimates for existing product
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lines' and 'new business plan' . Yet, because of the impor-
tant differences between doing business with the government
and doing business with commercial customers, which were
discussed in section B, the long term planning process must
treat these two classes of sales somewhat differently. This
subsection discusses long term planning for government sales,
and the next discusses long term planning for commercial sales.
Long term planning, as it relates to government sales,
involves the two types of planning indicated in Figure 4:
(i) planning for the future resource requirements implied
under existing government production contracts and under an-
ticipated follow-on government production contracts and (ii)
determining the upcoming government programs on which to bid
and planning for the resources - particularly technical staff
and research and development facilities requirements - required
to launch a successful bid for each. One of the devices plan-
ners use to illustrate both aspects of government sales planning
is what is called the going-out-of-business curve, an example
of which is the heavy curve in Figure 5. The going-out-of-
business curve shows what would happen to government sales if
current programs were not extended beyond their present ter-
mination dates and if no new programs were won. If the viability
of the division were heavily dependent on government sales,
then a lack of extensions and an absence of new programs could
literally drive the division out of existence (and hence the
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Figure 5: Going-Out-Of -Business Curve
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hopes to win and contract extensions it hopes to be granted
can be overlaid, as shown in the figure, to provide a graphical
representation of government sales for each year covered by the
long term plan. Each of the modified going-out-of-business
curves shows the growth pattern of government sales over the long
term planning period, contingent upon contract extensions and/or
new programs.
The type of planning that is done for existing government
programs - those that underlie the going-out-of-business
curve - depends on whether the program is in the production
stage or in the development and testing stage. For production
contracts, planning is relatively easy since the required tech-
nical advances have already been made, and in the case of air-
craft production, the division is likely to have estimated the
position of the learning curve. Production planning, which is
based largely on projections of future needs supplied to the
contractor by the government, is concerned mainly with manpower
and facilities needs. In aircraft production the direct labor
input per airplane will fall as the cumulative number of air-
craft produced increases due to the learning curve effect dis-
cussed in section B. A second factor that needs to be considered
in production planning is the program's peak production rate -
seldom do programs call for a uniform production rate - for this
can affect the need for plant floor space and storage space for
inventories of parts and equipment. A third factor is the pro-
gram's termination risk. If termination occurs, the divison
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will find itself with excess capacity unless some contingency
use for the facilities has been planned. However, according
to the executives interviewed by the author, estimation of the
termination risk is so highly subjective as to be, in practice,
of little use. In addition, the overcapacity that exists
164throughout much of the industry and the limited alternative
uses to which these production facilities can be put, imply
that termination will in most cases result in additional sparce
capacity until such time as a new program can be won.
For development and testing contracts the planning required
is more difficult than for production contracts because the
division and the firm are interested in making the required
technical advances within the required time and within the
projected costs. The prediction of the resources - mainly
engineering and design personnel, development facilities, and
the facilities and manpower required to assemble the test and
evaluation aircraft - needed to develop the product called for
under the contract is inherently more difficult than projecting
production resource requirements and costs. Even though de-
velopment and testing contracts are typically of the cost-plus
variety, thereby reducing the firm's share of the overall cost
risk below what it would be under a fixed price contract, the
contractor is anxious that its customer - the government - be
satisfied with the final product. It is important that the
product perform well enough and that its cost of production be
kept low enough that production funding will not be threatened.
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Indeed, several executives told the author that their companies
would make additional improvements not called for in the contract,
possibly even when there was virtually no chance of immediate re-
imbursement for costs incurred, in order to improve the product's
performance and thereby increase the likelihood of a larger and
longer production run.
The type of planning that must be carried out for new pro-
grams - planning that involves the allocation of scientific and
research talent, the allocation of IR&D funds plus the company's
own research and development funds, and the allocation of engi-
neering and design personnel and manpower and facilities to be
used in the development of such items as prototypes that will be
flown in a competition to determine the winner of relatively more
lucrative production contracts - is more difficult than the plan-
ning that is conducted for existing programs. The uncertainities
and business pressures are normally greater since the division
is interested not only in meeting the specifications of the re-
search and prototype development contracts assigned to it by
headquarters, but also in placing the company in an advantageous
position for any follow-on contracts.
The efficient allocation of research and development funds
and personnel is of critical importance to the firm because of
the long lead times required for research and development and
also because of the small number of new major programs. In plan-
ning their research and development program, the division and the
company must have some conception of what the government's needs
will be many years in advance. For this reason, long term planning
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studies often try to look out beyond the Department of Defense's
Five Year Defense Plan in order to predict the military's needs
far enough in advance to permit the necessary research to be under-
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taken. In other words, one of the responsibilities with which
divisional planners are charged is the responsibility of allocating
'pure research' moneys - some of which are reimbursed through IR&D
awards - in such a way that the company (and the division) will have
accumulated a sufficient store of technical and scientific skills
by the time a new program is formally announced to be competitive
in its attempt to win the program.
In allocating the research and development resources over
proposed new programs, divisional planners must analyze the
risks and potential returns associated with possible new pro-
grams and allocate the resources to those programs most likely
to lead to accomplishment of the division's goals and objectives.
Generally, it is impossible for a company to bid competitively
on every major new program, so selectivity is required, and
typically, the decision as to the major new programs the company
is going to try to win will be made by top management and will
be incorporated within the company's and within the appropriate
division's goals and objectives. It is then up to that division's
managers and planners to allocate the division's research and
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development resources to meet those goals and objectives.
4. Long Term Planning: Commercial Sales
As in the case of government sales, planning for
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commerical sales is best treated as two types of planning:
(i) planning resource requirements for existing product lines and
(ii) planning resource requirements for new business, including
both new products, e.g. a new generation of commercial passen-
ger aircraft, and new lines of business, e.g. the acquisition
of another company as part of a diversification strategy. Both
aspects of commercial sales planning are discussed below.
In general, the factors that must be considered when plan-
ning commercial sales are different from those that must be
considered when planning government sales. Variations in gov-
ernment sales are due to changes in the needs of the sole
customer or to changes in the sole customer's ability to pur-
chase weapons that result from changes in the levels of
Congressional funding of major weapons system programs, which
in turn can often be traced to political factors, i.e. to the
political cycle. In contrast, commercial sales are made to a
variety of customers who select from among a variety of products
that can meet their needs and whose ability to pay is largely
affected by the condition of their balance sheets and by the
state of demand for their goods and services, which in turn can
be traced to a variety of economic factors, i.e. to the business
cycle.
Long term commercial sales planning for existing product
lines requires a careful analysis of each competitor's products,
and unlike sales of existing products to the government, which
take place under conditions of bilateral monopoly, commercial
markets, such as those for commercial passenger aircraft, are
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usually served by a number of producers, each of which carefully
watches its market share - its percentage of total market sales.
In the case of commercial aircraft, planning for production is
similar to planning for the production of military aircraft in
that the learning curve effect must be taken into account. How-
ever, whereas a single contract for military aircraft will spec-
ify the delivery schedule, and by implication, the production
schedule, for that aircraft for a year, the production schedule
for commercial aircraft is typically less certain since the
number of customers is much greater; since the continued ability
of each purchaser to pay for the planes it has agreed to buy is
somewhat less certain; since each commercial customer's purchase
of a particular aircraft is more easily postponed both because
commercial aircraft can be leased and because the introduction
of a new commercial aircraft does not normally have associated
with it the sense of urgency that typically accompanies the
introduction of a new military aircraft; and since a potential
sale can be lost to one of the commercial producer's competitors.
Hence long term planning for sales of commercial aircraft, as
well as for sales of other commercial products, requires con-
tingency planning in the form of 'high' and 'low' sales esti-
mates for each year, in addition to the 'best' estimate of
future sales for each year. In the case of commercial aircraft,
the best estimates are obtained after careful analyses of trends
in first, commercial airline passenger traffic and second, in the
future demand for air cargo shipments have been performed. These
analyses are used to project future commercial airline fleet
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requirements for new aircraft, and in light of financial projections,
to predict the likely demand for new aircraft in each year over
the long term planning period. The 'high' and 'low' estimates
may be obtained by applying some simple rule of thumb, such as
'add 10 percent to the best estimate to obtain the high esti-
mate and subtract 10 percent from the best estimate to obtain
the low estimate for each year' . Alternatively, high and low
estimates may be obtained by varying the assumptions on which
the best estimates were based and by applying the same esti-
mation procedures to an 'optimistic' set of assumptions and
to a 'pessimistic' set of assumptions. As illustrated below
by Figure 6, this results in three sets of demand projections
for each year, one for each of three states of nature: the
expected state, as specified in the environmental forecast,




Figure 6: Projections of Long Term Demand for Commercial
Aircraft
One of top management's more difficult decisions, which can
greatly affect the long term plan, is the decision regarding
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what to do when the demand for a particular commercial airplane
has been very weak and threatens to remain weak for some time.
Commercial aircraft sales are generally made on a contractual
basis, but when the financial positions of the commercial
airlines worsen seriously, as they have in recent years, the
airlines are loath to enter into long term contracts. In
the absence of long term contracts or some other indication of
likely future demand, the commercial airplane maker has essen-
tially three choices: (i) to continue production at a low rate
1 68
and hope that future sales will materialize, (ii) to in-
troduce product variations, such as a 'stretch version' of the
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airplane - to try to increase sales, or (iii) to close
down the production line. The first two choices involve addi-
tional costs and potentially large financial risks, while
the third may require a massive write-off that can adversely
affect the firm's financial health over a period of several
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years.
Planning for new commercial business involves, as in the
case of planning for new government programs, considerably
greater uncertainty than planning for sales of existing prod-
ucts, in the case of a new generation of commercial passen-
ger aircraft, there are the risks discussed in section B.
The initial investment required often exceeds the company's
net worth, and if the introduction of the new plane has been
poorly timed or if potential demand for such a plane has been
seriously overestimated, the company's viability may be threat-
ened. In planning for diversification into new product lines
85
there are several factors that need to be considered. These
include the product line's compatibility - in terms of the nature
of the product and the requirements for marketing it - with
existing product lines, the need to hire production and staff
workers, the need to purchase equipment, and the financial re-
sources that will have to be tied up in the new product line.
In addition, if diversification is to take place by external
means, there is the problem of selecting a takeover candidate
and launching a successful bid for a controlling interest in
the firm. Normally these decisions and the required financial
arrangements are made at the headquarters level, although the
formulation of the technical, manpower and production, facili-
ties, and financial plans involving the new product line are
the responsibility of the division to which the new product
line has been assigned.
Once the sales estimates and new business plans for both
commercial sales and government sales have been prepared and
reviewed by divisional management, divisional planners can
derive the technical plan, the manpower and production plan,
and the facilities plan for the division as a whole, and then
from these, the division's financial plan. From there the
long term planning process proceeds as described in subsection
2 of this section.
5. Long Term Planning: Human Capital and Fixed Capital
The preceding subsection explored several of the im-
portant planning considerations that underlie the blocks
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labeled 'sales estimates for existing product lines' and 'new
business plan' in Figure 4. This subsection deals with the
next stage in the divisional long term planning process, and
in particular, with the technical plan and with the facilities
plan. The former is primarily concerned with the allocation
of the division's scientific and engineering talent - human
capital - whereas the latter is mainly concerned with the
allocation of plant and equipment - fixed capital.
The economic literature in recent years has contained many
books and papers that have explored the economic significance
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of human capital. The purpose of this section is not to
review that literature, but rather, it is first, to characterize
human capital and to indicate its importance to the major mili-
tary airframe builders, and second, to indicate how the exis-
tence and importance of human capital affect the long term
planning process in these firms.
Following Schultz and others, a firm's 'human capital' is
defined as the scientific and technical knowledge and skills
embodied in the scientists, engineers, designers, and techni-
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cians who work for the firm. In contrast, fixed capital
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consists of durable goods such as plant and equipment.
Both types of capital are valued by the firm for the services
they provide. In the case of human capital, there are the
services provided during the research and development phases
of a weapons system program, and in the case of fixed capital,
there are the services provided during the production phase of
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the program. In addition, both types of capital normally
require an investment on the part of the firm. Fixed capital
is normally purchased and maintained by the firm, although
1 7 f->
firms often lease plant and equipment, while human capital
must be accumulated through research and development activi-
ties funded, at least in part, by the firm, although firms can
in a sense lease human capital by hiring engineers and scientists
who have worked on similar projects for other aerospace firms.
There are also important differences between human capital
and fixed capital. First, human capital tends to accumulate
through use (i.e. experience) as skills and techniques are ac-
quired and as valuable lessons are learned from past mistakes,
whereas fixed capital tends to deteriorate through use. Second,
the typical airframe builder tends to enjoy greater flexibility
in its use of human capital than in its use of fixed capital.
Human capital can be gained or disposed of through the hiring
or laying off, respectively, of an individual, whereas fixed
capital, which comes in larger units, typically requires much
greater cash outlays when acquired and, because of the limited
alternative uses for much of the equipment, often can be sold
only at a loss. Third, knowledge and skills are transferable
so that improvements in human capital can be transmitted from
one individual to another, whereas embodying technological im-
provements in machinery more often requires that a completely
new machine be built. Fourth, due to differences in individual
learning ability and due also to the importance of recent
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experience on similar projects to the learning effect that underlies
the growth of human capital, the quality of human capital about
to be hired by a firm is generally more difficult for a manager
to evaluate than the quality of a piece of equipment for which
178engineering specifications and various test data are available.
Fifth and last, it is possible to order a particular piece of
equipment or a plant meeting certain specifications, but to
hire an individual with the requisite scientific background
and experience can involve a costly and time-consuming search
process. It should be noted that the last two factors are two
of the major reasons why the major airframe builders are anxious
to stabilize their scientific, engineering, design, and technical
staffs.
The importance of human capital to the major airframe builders
lies in the role each firm's scientists, engineers, designers, and
technicians play during the research and development phases of a
major weapons program. As discussed in section B, the develop-
ment of a new generation of aircraft typically calls for several
advances in the state of the art. Second, the military buyer
typically outlines its needs for a new weapons system, but leaves
it up to the several firms willing to enter the competition for
the program to submit specific designs. Similarly, the develop-
ment of a prototype requires a great deal of engineering and de-
sign work, and as the performance and overall effectiveness -
i.e. the quality - of what is produced weighs so heavily in the
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final decision, the firm's success in winning new programs
is heavily dependent on how well its scientists, engineers,
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designers and technicians perform.
The implications of the critical role played by human
capital for the long term planning process of the major airframe
builders are first, that scientists, engineers, designers, and
technicians are treated as a class of labor distinct from pro-
duction workers, and second, that these highly skilled workers
are treated more like fixed capital than like labor. That is,
planners make a conscious effort to time phase major programs
in such a way that the staff embodying human capital can re-
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main fully employed and reasonably stable over time. It
may also mean that, on occasion, a firm will bid on a program
or on a piece of a program, at least in part, because it needs
work to provide stable employment opportunities for its scien-
tific and technical staff.
Due to the overcapacity throughout much of the airframe
industry, which was discussed in section B, as well as the
paucity of new major weapons programs, it is the allocation
of human capital, rather than the allocation of fixed capital
that is the more critical capital allocation problem facing
these firms' planners. In particular, the decline in aircraft
sales since 1968 has forced over 70,000 scientists, engineers,
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and technicians to leave the industry, many of them for
good, and this decline in the pool of available talent has
made the airframe builders increasingly reluctant to release
these people for fear that in the future they might not be
able to rehire sufficient numbers when the need arises. While
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under more favorable business conditions, with demand pressing
against capacity, the airframe builders would also face the
problem of having to decide how to allocate spare productive
capacity and the decision as to whether to expand productive
capacity, the fixed capital allocation problem is not a pres-
sing one at the present time.
6. Long Term Planning as a Portfolio Selection Problem
Up to this point in this section, the discussion has
been mainly descriptive, rather than analytical, and has fo-
cused on long term planning at the divisional level. This
subsection considers long term planning at the headquarters
level and suggests that, in reviewing the amalgamated divi-
sional plans, top management approaches the long term plan-
ning problem in much the same way that an individual investor
approaches the problem of selecting the portfolio of securi-
ties that, in terms of his relative risk aversion, provides
the proper balance of risk and return.
As indicated in Figure 4, once the division has comple-
ted its financial plan, which lists the financial requirements
implied by its technical, manpower and production, and facil-
ities plans, it submits these four plans together with the
new business plan to the headquarters planning staff for their
review. The headquarters planning staff may require that cer-
tain divisions modify their plans. After the required modi-
fications have been made to the satisfaction of the corporate
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planning staff, the divisional long term plans are amalgamated
into a provisional corporate long term plan, which is typically
broken down into a corporate new business plan, a corporate
technical plan, a corporate manpower and production plan, a
corporate facilities plan, and a corporate financial plan, each
of which is, with the exception of the corporate financial plan,
an amalgamation of the respective divisional plans.
In addition, there may be one or more divisions that perform
support, rather than operational, duties. For example, there
may be a computer services division that provides for all the
data processing needs of the operating divisions but does not
sell to outside users. Even if it sells to outside users, these
sales may be peripheral to the division's support function. In
that case, the headquarters planning staff may find it more
efficient from a planning standpoint to have the support division
estimate only the external demand (if any) for its services and
to estimate the internal demand for the support services at the
same time it amalgamates the plans of the operating divisions.
External and internal demands for support services would then
be combined and the various provisional corporate plans would
be revised accordingly. Finally, the provisional corporate
plans are prepared in summary format for review by top manage-
ment and are then forwarded for their scrutiny.
One of top management's greatest concerns is the corporate
financial plan, which indicates the financial needs of the cor-
poration over the long term as well as the anticipated impact
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of the new business, technical, manpower and production, and
facilities plans on the firm's financial statements. In ad-
dition, since all funds generated internally that are avail-
able for distribution as dividends or for reinvestment are
allocated by top management, and since all funds that are
raised externally must be raised through the issuance of debt
or equity financial instruments or through a loan agreement
with one or more banks, in either case handled through the
corporate controller, it is necessary to add top manage-
ment's plans for obtaining the financial resources - i.e. the
money capital - needed to fund the activities of the operating
divisions to the amalgamated divisional financial plans.
In reviewing the corporate financial plan and the other
four plans that comprise the overall corporate long term plan,
top management faces a multiperiod portfolio selection prob-
lem. Associated with each of the product lines that the di-
visions plan to continue and also with each of the new business
ventures planned are (i) an expected return - a contribution
to corporate net operating income - for each year out to the
long term planning horizon and (ii) various risks, which fall
within the categories discussed in section B. These risks can
have a major impact on the corporation's overall financial risk.
In addition, the product lines and projects must also be evalu-
ated in terms of the contribution of each to the other objectives
of the corporation. The firm's present financial health as well
as its capacity for borrowing limit the extent to which current
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commitments can be undertaken, thereby imposing a "budget
constraint," while current commitments will affect future
earnings and future borrowing capacity, which in turn will limit
the extent to which future commitments can be undertaken.
The foregoing suggests what the author believes may turn
out to be an interesting analytical approach to understanding
the typical airframe builder's long term planning problem.
It is the author's intention to explore this possible approach
further in a subsequent paper.
7 . Summary
This section has described the typical airframe builder's
long term planning process - the second of the three phases of
the corporate planning cycle. Key elements in the planning pro-
cess were highlighted, the special treatment accorded human cap-
ital was discussed, the headquarters planning staff's role in
coordinating divisional planning and in amalgamating divisional
plans in order to prepare an overall corporate long term plan
for review by top management was described, and the formulation
of the corporate long term financial plan was discussed. In
addition, an analytical approach to modeling top management's
role in the long term planning process was suggested.
The next section describes the short term planning process
and indicates how consistency between the long term plan just
discussed and the short term plan is achieved.
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F. SHORT TERM PLANNING: ANNUAL BUDGET PREPARATION
1. Introduction
The third phase of the corporate planning cycle involves
the preparation of the short term, or operating, plan', which is
generally carried out for the first year of the long term plan-
18 2 m ,nmg period only. The annual operating plan, which for rea-
sons of consistency, is derived from the corporate long term
plan, provides much greater detail for the period covered than
does the long term plan.
The annual operating plan is presented in the form of a
1 QO
detailed budget. Unlike the long term plan, which is mainly
concerned with the allocation of capital resources and with the
development of strategies and plans whose main impact will be on
sales and earnings five years or more into the future, the short
term plan is mainly concerned with the allocation of variable re-
sources and with the development of strategies and plans that
will largely determine sales and earnings within the next year.
Whereas the long term plan is heavily concerned with developing
new product lines to replace those that will eventually be phased
out and with winning new programs to replace those that are due
to expire, the short term plan is heavily concerned with con-
trolling direct costs and overhead cost for the firm's current com-
mercial and military product lines. Also unlike the long term plan,
u •
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which generally summarizes projections on a year-by-year basis,
the short term plan is presented on a month-by-month basis.
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This section describes the short term planning process that
is followed within the nine major military airframe builders.
As was the case with the long term planning process, most of
the short term planning takes place at the divisional level,
with the headquarters planning staff once again coordinating
divisional planning efforts and with top management once again
carefully reviewing the final product of this phase of the
planning cycle.
2. Short Term Planning at the Divisional Level
After top management has approved the corporate long
term plan - normally late in the third quarter - the short term
planning process can begin. This process begins much as the
long term planning process was begun, namely, with the distribu-
tion of the corporation's short term goals and objectives by top
management. These short term goals and objectives are generally
more specific than the long term goals and objectives and are
normally accompanied by a set of specific guidelines for division-
al short term planning. For example, the long term plan is likely
to specify an overall profit margin, i.e. the ratio of net opera-
ting income to net sales, for each year, while the short term plan
is likely to specify the profit margin (or more specifically, the
'contribution margin') for each product for the coming year. To
ensure consistency with the corporate long term plan, these goals
and objectives and guidelines sent out from headquarters are based
on the approved corporate long term plan. As was the case with
long term planning, from this point in the short term planning
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process onward, most of the actual planning takes place at the
divisional level.
Figure 7 illustrates the short term planning processes as it is
typically carried out at the divisional level. The process begins
with a statement of the assumptions on which the divisional short
term plan is to be based and with the formulation of the division's
short term goals and objectives. The planning assumptions flow
directly from the corporate and divisional long term plans, and the
goals and objectives follow from the divisional long term goals and
objectives embodied in the corporate long term plan and the more
specific corporate short term goals and objectives and planning
guidelines supplied to the division. As in the case of the long
term planning process, headquarters approval of the division's
goals and objectives is required, although such approval is less
problematical than in the long term case because the basic direction
and strategies for the corporation and for the division have already
been mapped out during the long term planning process.
Once the division's short term goals and objectives and plan-
ning assumptions have been approved, the goals and objectives to-
gether with the divisional business strategies approved as part
of the long term planning process are used by divisional manage-
ment to formulate the division's short term business strategies -
the collection of policies that specify the division's competi-
tive position vis-a-vis its competitors in each of the commercial
markets in which it sells and its approach to contract negotiations







































Figure 7: The Divisional Short Term Planning Cycle
98
taken to ensure that these short term strategies are consistent
with the long term strategies that underlie the long term plan.
For example, not altering the design of a particular product, say
a particular type of aircraft, may enable the division to avoid
the expense involved in design changes, and thereby boost the
division's overall profit margin, though the failure to 'modernize'
the airplane may hurt future sales and profits in the event
competitive pressures or a change in government regulations force
these changes to be made hurriedly.
After establishing the division's short term business
strategies, divisional management directs the division's
planning staff to collect the information needed to determine
the actual resource requirements of the division and to plan
how these requirements will be met. This part of the short
term planning process results in several component plans, which,
for convenience, have been grouped into four component plans in
Figure 7. The monthly facilities usage and expenditure plan
indicates the plant and equipment allocated to each product line -
whether government or commercial - for each of the twelve months
covered by the operating plan. It also indicates the time of
arrival and use of new equipment that will be purchased and the
beginning of operation and use(s) of new plant that will become
available during the year. The monthly overheads plan indicates
the monthly overhead rates to be applied to direct labor to deter-
mine the cost of goods sold. The plan gives a breakdown as to
general and administrative costs, the cost of facilities, research
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and development, etc. The monthly manpower and production plan
indicates monthly output rates, the delivery of commercial and
military aircraft on a monthly basis, direct (i.e. for production)
labor requirements (numbers of personnel and their cost) on a
monthly basis, and the projected monthly hiring/firing quotas.
The subcontracting and procurement plan indicates subcontractors
for government programs and details the firm's need for inputs
other than labor on a monthly basis, along with the anticipated
costs of these inputs.
The four plans just described form the division's annual oper-
ating plan, which is submitted to the headquarters planning staff
after it has been approved by the division's management. As in the
long term planning process, the headquarters planning staff may
return the plan for modifications. Finally, after, all divisional
short term plans have been accepted, they are amalgamated into a
corporate operating plan. Also incorporated into this plan is the
annual operating plan for the corporate office. The corporate short
term plan is submitted to top management for its review, and once
this plan has been approved, the short term planning process ends.
At the conclusion of the short term planning process, the
corporate planning cycle begins again. At the same time, a cor-
porate review process begins, during which the just completed annual
operating plan will be reviewed on a quarterly, or possibly on a
semiannual, basis in light of actual operating results. The
next section describes this review process. The remainder of
this section looks more closely at certain important aspects of
the short term planning process just described.
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3. Short Term Planning: Government Sales, Contract
Performance, and Cost Controls
Much of the short term planning associated with the sale
of goods and services to the government can be based on the
provisions of the contracts that were negotiated prior to the
start of the short term planning process. In particular, for
such items as military aircraft, government contracts generally
specify product performance standards, a monthly delivery schedule,
the price per plane (since, as pointed out in section B, pro-
duction contracts are typically of the fixed price variety) , the
method by which the fee will be determined, etc. Such information
proves helpful to the contractor during the preparation of the
monthly manpower and production plan.
In addition, the government negotiates the overhead rates to
1 8 S
be applied on all contracts, and one of the by-products of
this process is an estimate of reimbursable overhead costs. Under
certain circumstances, such as those surrounding either an audit
by the General Accounting Office or a general management review
carried out by, or at the direction of, the administrative con-
tracting officer, the government can issue specific directives
1 8f->
to a contractor concerning its overheads. Such information
can prove helpful to the contractor when it formulates its monthly
overhead plan.
Since contractor performance (or effort) weighs heavily in
1 87
determining the fee to be earned, the division must care-
fully plan the allocation of labor over government contracts
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during the short term planning process. Where prices are fixed,
as they are on most development contracts as well as on pro-
duction contracts, control of costs is critical in order to
prevent costs from rising and consuming part or all of the fee.
Even under cost plus contracts, cost control is important, for
even though costs now play a smaller role in determining the
size of the fee, the contractor's productive efficiency, and
in particular, improvements in productivity, are now included
L * 188as a factor in determining the fee.
A second important performance factor is the contractor's
performance in meeting delivery schedules. Where the number of
subcontractors and suppliers is large, the problem of trying
to control the scheduling of production and delivery becomes
more difficult. A subcontractor making a late delivery can
cause the production schedule to slip, and this can lead to a
late delivery, for which the prime contractor is likely to be
penalized. Controlling subcontractor performance often neces-
sitates placing teams of people, analogous to the government's
plant representative offices, in the subcontractor's plants,
and this in turn requires that manpower and dollars be allocated
189
for that purpose.
In short term planning connected with government sales, then,
the emphasis is placed on allocating personnel and dollars so
as to ensure satisfactory contract performance. In particular,
short term planning for government sales emphasizes control of
production and overhead costs and the control of production
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rates in order to meet delivery schedules. Similarly, as the
next subsection makes clear, short term planning for commercial
sales also displays a decided cost and productivity emphasis.
4. Short Term Planning: Commercial Sales and
Operating Efficiency
Short term planning for commercial sales is, in some
important respects, more difficult than short term planning
for government sales, although the basic thrust of the planning
process is essentially the same. In each case short term plan-
ning is concerned with the employment levels of the variable
inputs needed to satisfy the firm's production commitments.
What tends to make commercial sales planning somewhat more
difficult is the greater uncertainty concerning actual product
demand. On the other hand, the difficulties associated with
trying to predict resource requirements for research and develop-
ment projects, which tend to complicate the task of government
sales planning, generally have a smaller impact on the commercial
side of the business. Overall, then, the relative difficulty
of these two aspects of short term planning, and by implication,
the relative amounts of time, manpower, and money that must be
allocated to each aspect of short term planning, is largely de-
pendent on the proportion of government sales made under research
and development contracts.
In the case of commercial aircraft sales, the short term
planning problem is more complicated than the one for military
aircraft sales. While commercial aircraft are sold on a
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contractual basis, the limited financial resources of the com-
mercial airlines make contract cancellations or delivery post-
ponements more likely than in the case of military aircraft
190
sales. A second problem associated with commercial air-
craft sales concerns advance payments. If such payments are
made at all on a commercial contract, they are generally much
lower than progress payments made by the government under
191
military contracts. In addition, when the financial po-
sitions of commercial airlines worsen, they become loath to
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enter into long term contracts, preferring instead to buy
aircraft on much shorter notice once they have generated suf-
ficient financial resources with which to make the purchase.
Assuming the decision has been made (as part of the long term
planning process) to continue production of the airplane or
of some modified version, a decision concerning the produc-
tion rate for the coming year must be made. This production
rate must satisfy the constraint on the minimum feasible pro-
duction rate, which is imposed by the technical conditions
of production.
In contrast to the special planning problems associated with
commerical aircraft sales, planning for the sales of other
commerical products generally does not lead to problems any
different from those faced by the airframe builders' non-aero-
space commercial competitors. The main difference, in terms
of planning, between these sales and sales of commercial air-
craft is in inventory planning. In planning commercial
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aircraft sales, production schedules are set to conform as closely
as possible to the delivery schedule for firm orders so that in-
ventories of completed aircraft can be held near zero. In plan-
ning for other commercial sales, for which inventories of finished
goods are a normal part of doing business, one of the purposes
of short term planning is to determine the appropriate (in light
of demand and cost considerations) inventory levels.
Overall, the short term planning process is designed to a-
chieve operating efficiency in the area of commercial sales. As
was the case with government sales, short term planning of com-
mercial operations focuses on variable inputs such as the labor
used in the production process and seeks to determine employment
levels consistent with cost minimization.
5. Summary
The short term planning process is concerned mainly with
the allocation of variable inputs among existing and about-to-be-
introduced product lines and with the efficient use of the firm's
existing capital resources, in contrast to the long term planning
process, which is mainly concerned with the acquisition or dis-
posal of capital resources, the winning of new government con-
tracts, and the development of new commercial lines of business.
Because the short term planning process begins once the long term
planning process has been completed and uses the long term plan
as a planning base, short term planning normally requires just
one quarter, as opposed to the two quarters usually required for
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long term planning. Using the long term plan as a basis for
the short term plan also ensures consistency between the two
plans.
One of the important outputs of the short term planning
process is a set of provisional quarterly financial state-
ments for the corporation. That is, once top management has
approved the corporate operating plan submitted by the head-
quarters planning staff (see Figure 7), a provisional profit
and loss statement and a provisional balance sheet can be pre-
pared for each quarter - or for each month, if so desired - of
the corporate fiscal year. These provisional financial state-
ments are used by top management during the fiscal year to
check the progress of the corporation toward its long term and
short term financial goals and objectives.
While the completion of the corporate operating plan and
the preparation of the provisional corporate financial state-
ments mark the end of the corporate planning cycle, there re-
mains a very important follow-on to the corporate planning cy-
cle, namely, the corporate review(s) . The next section describes
the corporate review process, the purpose of which is to measure
periodically the performance of the divisions against the re-
spective divisional plans and to modify the divisional and cor-
porate operating plans in light of operating experience.
G. THE CORPORATE REVIEW PROCESS
Though substantial resources are devoted to formulating
the corporate and divisional plans, the uncertainties associated
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with estimates of product demand, input costs and availabilities,
etc., in the future, as well as unforeseen circumstances, such
as an oil embargo, an unexpected sharp decline in the demand for
airline passenger travel, or an unanticipated contract termina-
tion, will cause actual performance to deviate from the projec-
tions outlined in the corporate and divisional operating plans.
Thus, it has been deemed necessary by the managements of the
major airframe builders to conduct formal periodic reviews -
normally on a quarterly basis, though in some cases, on a semi-
annual basis - to measure these deviations, and if possible, to
determine their cause so that the divisional and corporate oper-
ating plans for the remainder of the fiscal year can be adjusted
in accordance with the firm's operating experience.
The existence of the review process is indicative of the fact
that the corporate planning and review process, when considered
as a whole, is an adaptive process. That is, the planning and
review process exhibits feedback control in that each periodic
corporate review causes information on divisional performance to
be generated that is used by top management and divisional man-
agers to modify their operating plans. In addition, the corpor-
ate reviews enable top management and the headquarters planning
staff to reevaluate periodically the operating environment and
performance of each division. The information collected and the
evaluations performed as part of the corporate reviews for the
third and fourth quarters of the fiscal year are, to the extent
that they enable corporate planners to evaluate the current state
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of demand in each of the firm's product markets, helpful to
the headquarters planning staff at the time it prepares the
environmental forecast.
Figure 8 shows the corporate planning and review cycle
for arbitrary year T. The whole cycle spans a period approx-
imately nine quarters in length. The planning for year T
takes place the previous year. The corporate review for each
quarter takes place soon after the end of the quarter, with
the time lag determined by how much time is required to col-
lect and process the data needed to carry out the review.
The fourth quarter review is different from the three earlier
reviews in that, not only can the full year's performance be
measured against the whole operating plan, but also the review
of the year's performance forms the basis for the annual re-
port to the firm's shareholders.
Each quarterly review contains the following basic elements.
First, the actual results - sales by product line, levels of re-
source usage, net operating income for the division, etc. - are
summarized for both the quarter and the year to date. The actuals
are compared with the approved operating plan. Usually this is
done simply by listing the actual figure next to the projection -
and significant variations are noted. Second, based on the ac-
tuals to date, an up-to-date forecast for the balance of the fis-
cal year is presented, along with a statement of any changes that
may have been made in the underlying assumptions since the oper-
ating plan was approved. Third, the status of major military
108
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and commercial programs is reviewed, with special emphasis placed
on problems - existing or potential - that might in the future
193
require the attention of top management, e.g. those problems
that might call for large expenditures or major schedule changes
and that could affect other divisions of the company. Fourth,
the status of capital expenditure programs and any cost or
schedule changes to them are reviewed. Fifth, research and de-
velopment activities, their cost, and significant accomplish-
ments are reviewed. Sixth, efforts directed toward winning
new military programs that are near to bidding are reviewed.
For each of the above elements of the review process, top manage-
ment reviews the record to date and suggests appropriate modi-
fications of strategies, expenditure levels, etc. In particular,
one or more of the divisional operating plans may be changed
at the direction of top management in light of that division's
performance to date.
The corporate review process, then, is a device that enables
top management to review periodically the performance of the
corporation's operating divisions and to determine what changes
need to be made, in light of each division's experience to date,
to each division's operating plan in order to improve the likeli-
hood that by the end of the fiscal year the corporation's goals
and objectives for the year will have been met.
H. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The nine major military airframe builders in the United
States are large diversified organizations whose performance
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is influenced to a significant degree by variations in the size
and number of major military aircraft programs. The business
environment within which these firms operate is characterized
by several different types of risk, some of which arise out of
their special relationship with their main customer, the U.S.
government, and some of which are peculiar to the highly tech-
nical and specialized nature of their aerospace business. In
addition, the apparent decline in the number of major military
aircraft programs, the stagnant demand for commercial passenger
jet aircraft, and the increasing foreign competition from firms
financed by their governments, have limited the opportunities
for growth in these firms' traditional markets, and more im-
portantly, have threatened the structure of the industry.
Due in part to the nature of the aerospace business and in
part to their dependence on the sale of high technology air-
craft to the government, these firms have had to evolve a long
term planning process capable of coping with the risks they
face. These firms must plan their allocation of human capital
on the basis of very limited information, knowing that the
penalty for guessing incorrectly may include the failure to win
a major program. They must allocate research expenditures so
as to develop the technology that will be needed by weapons
systems that may not reach the development stage for a decade
or more. Thoughout the research and development process they
must compete with one another for the favor of their main
customer, the U.S. government, and for the relatively more
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lucrative production contracts that secure for each of their
recipients a place among the select group of prime government
contractors.
Their commercial business, particularly if it includes the
sale of commercial passenger aircraft, can also entail substan-
tial risks. The number of potential customers is greater, but
the financial strength of each is not only weaker than the
government' s, but also susceptible to the swings of the business
cycle. Since the cost of developing a new generation of com-
mercial aircraft may exceed the developing company's net worth,
the risk of ultimate financial failure cannot be ignored. More-
over, in recent years a severe recession and an increase in
foreign competition have intensified these risks.
The substantial risks attendant upon their aerospace opera-
tions and the limited growth opportunities provided by the mar-
kets for commercial and military aircraft have caused many of
the major airframe builders to look outside the industry for
opportunities to diversify and grow. But the limited alter-
native uses to which their fixed capital can be put and the
nature of their aerospace business - the production and marketing
of highly sophisticated products to a relatively small number of
commercial and government buyers - have forced these firms to be
very selective with regard to how they choose to diversify.
Similarly, the nature of the aerospace business and the
dependence of these firms on sales of aircraft to the government
give rise to special problems in short term planning. Due to
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the high costs of temporarily shutting down a production line
or of maintaining an inventory of completed aircraft, produc-
tion schedules must be set to conform as closely as possible
to anticipated delivery schedules. Due to the importance of
meeting the specifications of government production contracts,
most of which are granted on a fixed price basis, it is neces-
sary that production schedules and production and overhead
costs be carefully controlled.
All the factors mentioned above combine to make the typical
airframe builder's task of planning a difficult one, the re-
quirements of which are, in the opinion of this writer, more
demanding than those faced by the majority of non-aerospace
firms. This paper has described how the major airframe
builders conduct their long term and short term planning. The
discussion has highlighted the important aspects of each process
and has indicated the relationship between the two. The paper
has also drawn attention to the important differences between
doing business with the government and doing business with com-
mercial customers and has pointed out the implications of these
differences for the long term and short term planning processes
of the nine major military airframe builders.
It is the author's intention to develop an analytical model
of the planning cycle described in this paper and to use the
model to study the long term and short term planning processes
of the major military airframe builders, and in particular, to
study how certain specified changes in government procurement
113
policies are likely to affect these firms and how the risks
discussed in section B affect not only the observed behavior
of these firms, but also the way they conduct their planning.




1. This paper is based in part on personal interviews con-
ducted at The Boeing Company, Fairchild Republic Company
(a division of Fairchild Industries, Inc.), the Convair
Division of General Dynamics Corporation, Grumman
Corporation, Vought Corporation (formally LTV Aerospace
Corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of the LTV
Corporation) , Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, McDonnell
Douglas Corporation, Northrop Corporation, and Rockwell
International Corporation. The author would like to
thank the executives with whom he spoke for their
generous assistance, though he alone accepts full re-
sponsibility for any errors that may have been committed
in describing these firms' planning processes. This
paper is also included as Chapter Six in the author's
forthcoming doctoral dissertation.
2. The term 'airframe' refers to the body of the airplane
without its engines. For the information of the reader,
the two major producers of engines that are installed in
the airframes produced by the firms listed in footnote 1
are United Technologies Corp. (through its Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft Div.) and General Electric Co.
3. See "A shakeout for U.S. fighter-plane makers," Business
Week (June 9, 1 97 5 ), and "General Dynamics: Winning in the
Aerospace Game," Business Week (May 3, 1976). According
to these articles, the threatened firms are Fairchild,
Grumman, and Vought (LTV). However, Joseph G. Gavin, Jr.,
President of Grumman Corp., has stated publicly that he
expects follow-on orders to carry F-14 production beyond
the currently projected 1980 termination date. See "The
New Face of the Defense Industry," Business Week (January
10, 1977), p. 55. A recent study conducted jointly by the
Department of Defense and the Office of Management and
Budget concludes, however, that there is excess capacity
in the aircraft industry costing the Department of Defense
approximately $400 million per year to maintain and
recommends that the industry be consolidated. See
"Washington Roundup," Aviation Week & Space Technology
(January 24, 1977), p. 11.
4. See "Conferees Vote Money for the Bl Bomber And for Nuclear-
Powered 'Strike' Cruiser," Wall Street Journal (July 28,
1975); "Bl Decision Is Delayed by Senate Panel In Passing
Defense Appropriations Bill," Wall Street Journal (July 22,
1976); and "Conferees Vote to Put Bl Bomber Funds On Tight
Rein Until After Inauguration," Wall Street Journal (September
1, 1976).
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5. See "Early Revival Unlikely As Jumbo-Plane Sales Continue
to Languish," Wall Street Journal (August 10, 1976), and
"Aerospace and Defense," Forbes (January 1, 1977), p. 136.
There are some signs, however, that the demand for commer-
cial aircraft, and in particular, the Boeing 727, is be-
ginning to pick. up. Revised noise standards and the need
for replacement aircraft are at least partly responsible.
See "Airlines give Boeing a one-shot boom," Business Week
(October 11, 1976). The long term outlook is also bright-
ening, though many airlines will require a period of sus-
tained profitability if they are to be able to satisfy
their need for new aircraft. See "Billions and billions
and billions to grab for," The Economist (September 11,
1976); "Time To Fasten Seat Belts?," Forbes (October 15,
1976); and "Nation's Airlines Face A Key Problem: How To
Pay for New Airplanes," Wall Street Journal (October 22,
1976).
6. See "Lockheed Woes Increase as Plan For Rescue Fails,"
Wall Street Journal (March 3, 1975), and "Biting the
bullet on the TriStar," Business Week (April 12, 1976).
However, indications are that the patient is on the mend.
See "The Fabulous Invalid," Forbes (August 15, 1976), and
"Lockheed Restructuring Voted by Owners Of Common; Debt-
Holder Approval Seen," Wall Street Journal (September
30, 1976).




8. That is, 'total package procurement' , in which companies
were forced to accept a single fixed price contract covering
both development and production, is no longer part of the
Department of Defense's procurement policy. The current
DOD policy regarding major system acquisitions is outlined
in Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, "Major System
Acquisitions" (January 18, 1977) and in Department of
Defense Directive 5000.2, "Major System Acquisition Process"
(January 18, 1977).
9. And, in at least one case, in accordance with the wishes of
the firm's debt-holders. See footnote 6.
10. K.G. Harr, Jr., "A Short Course in Aerospace Economics 1976,"
Aerospace (September 1976), p. 11.
11. Ridder and Heinz classify 634 firms as belonging to the aero-
space industry based on the industry classifications provided
by Dun and Bradstreet's Million Dollar Directory , Standard
and Poor's Register of Corporations
, and several other
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sources. See W.C. Ridder and M.K. Heinz, "Structure,
Conduct, and Performance of the United States Aerospace
Industry," unpublished M.S. thesis (Naval Postgraduate
School; Monterey, California; March 1976). Ridder and
Heinz provide an interesting historical perspective on
the industry as well as a careful analysis of the in-
dustry's structure, conduct, and performance. An earlier
study of the aerospace industry that carefully examined
the major airframe builders is H.O. Stekler, The Structure
and Performance of the Aerospace Industry (University of
California Press; Berkley; 1965). After allowing for
mergers and after excluding Martin Marietta, which no
longer builds aircraft, Stekler 's list of the major air-
frame builders is identical to the list of firms in
footnote 1. Ibid
. ,
p. 47. A second study by Carroll
considers these firms as well as the missile frame builders.
S.L. Carroll, "The Airframe Industry," unpublished Ph.D.














16. Strictly speaking, LTV is not an aerospace firm. Because
aerospace sales constitute approximately 12 percent of
total sales (see Table 3 below) , whereas steel operations
contribute 39 percent and meat and food products contribute
48 percent, as reported in the company's Form 10-K for its
fiscal year 1975, the company is usually classified as a
'conglomerate', rather than as a member of any single industry
(for example, see "Multicompanies, " Forbes (January 1, 1977),
p. 101). The firm does, however, participate in the industry
through its Vought Corp. subsidiary, and if the significance
to LTV of this participation were to be judged in terms of
profits, rather than sales, then, in 1975 at least, aerospace
production would become preeminent (see Table 6 below).
17. These firms also play very important roles in the international
market for commercial aircraft. The Aerospace Industries
Association of America estimates that roughly four of every








19. See, for example, "Cruise Missile's Future Is Mainly Up
to Carter; Its Potential Is Great," Wall Street Journal
(January 3, 1977), and "Defense Budget of $110.1 Billion
Proposes Big Weapons Rise With Little Fat to Cut," Wall
Street Journal (January 18, 1977).
20. These factors, and their impact on the defense industry,
are discussed in M.L. Weidenbaum, The Economics of Peace-
time Defense (Praeger; New York; 1974).
21. Since 1968 total employment within the aerospace industry
has fallen by more than one-third. Moreover, between 1968
and 1975 more than 70,000 highly skilled jobs - scientists,




22. For example, in the Fortune 500 ranking for 1970, Boeing
was ranked 17, Lockheed was ranked 33, and McDonnell Douglas
was ranked 44. See "The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest
Industrial Corporations," Fortune (May 1971).
23. One added indication of this is the fact that, if Vought
Corp. were ranked separately from the rest of LTV, it
would rank number 330 in the FORTUNE 500.
24. Six of the top 10 are airframe builders. Of the remaining
four top 10 DOD contractors, United Technologies Corp.
(no. 3), through its Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division, has
contracts to build engines for three of the four new fighters;
General Electric Co. (no. 7) has the engine contract for the
F-18; and Litton Industries Inc. (no. 8) and Hughes Aircraft
Co. (no. 9) are also important suppliers of aerospace products,







27. It will be argued below that it is human capital - in the
form of the knowledge and experience embodied in skilled
engineers and scientists - rather than physical capital -
in the form of plant and equipment, some of which is owned
by the government - that is the scarcer of the two components
of the firm's total capital resources and that is, consequent-
ly, of greater concern to each firm's strategic planners who





29. D.E. Raphael of the Stanford Research Institute believes
that the aerospace industry faces an impending widespread
.
capital shortage, and he estimates that the working cap-
ital requirements of these firms will rise from $5.9
billion in 1975 to $8.8 billion in 1980 and to $15 billion







p. 52, and Department of Defense, Defense Procurement
Circular Number 76-3 (Washington, D.C.; September 1,1976),
p. 12.
31. Comparative figures are provided in "Where Private Industry
Puts Its Research Money," Business Week (June 28, 1976).
32. Ibid
,
p. 65. Even though DOD funds a large proportion of
defense-related research, it does not finance 100 percent
of the research, and on a project-by-project basis each of
the airframe builders is risking large sums of money. For
example, Boeing Co. spent $41 million of its own money, in
addition to $95.2 million supplied by DOD, for research and
development connected with the YC-14, the new short take-off
-
and -landing transport being developed for the Air Force (in




33. The references that set out current DOD policy regarding
major weapons system acquisition are given in footnote 8.
34. The implications of the type of contract for risk-sharing
between the government and the contractor are discussed
below in subsection 6.
35. One aerospace executive told the author that his company
estimated that approximately 56 percent of IR&D funds were
spent on projects that would never result in fruitful mili-
tary applications, and that, of the remainder, only one
quarter (i.e. 11 percent of the total) would be spent on
developing weapons systems that his company would produce
(the other three quarters being spent on projects that
would lose out to other firms)
.
36. One of the earliest articles on the subject was T.P. Wright,
"Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes," Journal of the
Aeronautical Sciences (vol. 3; no. 4; February 1936), pp.
122-128. See also K. Hartley, "The Learning Curve and Its
Application to the Aircraft Industry," Journal of Industrial
Economics (vol. 13; no. 2; March 1965), pp. 122-128. The
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existence of the learning curve has been taken into account
in production and cost planning by military, as well as by
industry, planners. For a survey of Air Force applications
see H. Asher, "Cost-Quantity Relationships in the Airframe
Industry," R-291 (The RAND Corporation; Santa Monica, CA;
1956). It should be noted that the learning curve phenomenon
is not unique to the airframe industry. For other industries
in which it applies see W.Z. Hirsch, "Firm Progress Ratios,"
Econometrica (vol 24; no. 2; April 1956) pp. 136-143. In
addition, the phenomenon of the learning curve also has ap-
plications at the macroeconomic level. See P.J. Verdoorn,
"Complementarity and Long-Range Projections," Econometrica
(vol 24; no. 4; October 1956), pp. 429-450, and K.J. Arrow,
"The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing," Review of
Economic Studies (vol. 29; 1962), pp. 155-173.
37. An interesting general discussion of learning curves is pro-
vided in S.C. Webb, Managerial Economics (Houghton Mifflin;
Boston; 1976), ch. 17.
38 Hartley, op.cit.
,
p. 122, and Webb, op.cit.
,
p. 251.
39. The equation of the learning curve in Figure 1 is
I = 8000 x -0-32193
^
where £ is the direct labor input per airframe and x is the
cumulative number of airframes produced. More generally, a
learning curve satisfies an equation of the form
I = ax b
>
where a is the direct labor input of the first airframe pro-
duced and b = log
? p, where p is the percent of learning expressed
as a decimal and where log 2 signifies a logarithm to the base
2. Note that the shape of the learning curve implies that
the learning process is subject to steadily diminishing returns.
40. Though inflation might cause the cost per airframe measured in
current dollars to increase - if rising unit input costs more
than offset the effect of improved labor efficiency - the cost
per airframe would still fall when measured in term of dollars
of constant purchasing power (i.e. in real terms).
41. In essence, the controversy surrounding the Navy's decision to
procure the F-18 despite congressional pressure to procure the
F-17, which was a modification of the F-16 selected previously
by the Air Force, was the result of this sort of disagreement
as to whether the additional costs incurred in selecting a
different design could be justified on the grounds of improved
effectiveness.
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42. The actual point beyond which a major program becomes •
virtually nontransferable probably lies somewhere be-
fore the award of the first production contract, but
after the selection of the winner of the prototype com-
petition. That is, during the final development and
the test and evaluation stages of the program, the firm
that won the prototype competition develops the finished
product. Since the technology developed and the ex-
perience accumulated during these stages cannot be trans-
ferred costlessly, at some point the potential costs of
transferring the program become so high as to in effect
preclude a change of prime contractor.
43. That is, a market for a product characterized by a single
buyer (the Department of Defense through one of its ser-
vices) and a single seller (the contractor) . Bilateral
monopoly is discussed in most elementary price theory
textbooks. For example, see R. Sherman, The Economics
of Industry (Little, Brown and Company; Boston; 1974),
pp. 283-287.
44. See "Lockheed Sets L-1011 Charge Of $515 Million," Wall
Street Journal (March 31, 1976).
45. The current competition between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
for a contract worth approximately $2 billion to build
midair refueling tankers is an example. The Boeing entry
will utilize the 747 airframe, while the McDonnell Douglas
entry will utilize the DC 10 airframe. (The Lockheed entry
a derivative of the L-1011 - has already been eliminated.)







47. This latter figure was computed by treating Vought Corp.
as if it were an aerospace firm separate from LTV Corp.
48. This procedure has a strong impact on Northrop Corp.'
s
government sales. If sales to foreign governments were
included among 'government sales' , then the share of
government sales in Northrop Corp.' s total sales would ex-
ceed 80 percent. The main reason for this large difference
is that the primary market for Northrop Corp.'s F-5 fighter
is foreign governments.
49. See footnotes 21 and 22.
50. For example, sales of the A-10 aircraft formed 23% of
Fairchild Industries ! s total sales during 1975. Fairchild





51. Defense Procurement Circular No. 76-3 , op.clt
.
The DOD's
primary motive was to encourage defense contractors to
increase their investment in plant and cost-saving new
equipment. The Profit '76 study recommended four major
changes designed to accomplish this. First, interest,
including the imputed interest on contractor-owned facili-
ties, became an allowable cost. Second, the contractor's
level of investment in facilities was introduced as a
factor into the weighted guidelines that government con-
tracting officers must follow in negotiating a profit ob-
jective with the contractor. Third, risk will be weighed
more heavily and cost will be weighed less heavily in
negotiating profit levels. Fourth, productivity improve-
ments were introduced into, and past contractor perform-
ance was deleted from, the list of guidlines used to de-
termine profit levels. It should be noted that the policy
changes will be less favorable to the airframe builders
than they will be to shipbuilders and other government
contractors, according to Brig. General James W. Stansberry,
USAF, Director, Profit '76, quoted in "Pentagon Drafts Policy
to Spur Spending By Defense Contractors on New Facilities,"
Wall Street Journal (July 6, 1976).
52. Ibid.
, pp. 12-15; Aerospace Industries Association of America,
Risk Elements in Government Contracting (Washington, D.C.;
October 1970), pp. 6-9; Aerospace Profits vs. Risks
(Washington, D.C.; June 1971), ch. 4; and J.R. Fox, Arming
America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons (Division of Research,
Harvard Business School; Boston; 1974), pp. 236-240.
53. The argument that risks are high and returns are low in the
aerospace industry in relation to other industries is made
in Harr, op.cit.
,
p. 12, and in J.K. Brown and G.S. Stothoff,
The Defense Industry: Some Perspectives from the Financial
Community
,
(Division of Management Research, The Conference
Board; New York; 1976). The opposite view is expressed in
Weidenbaum, op. cit.
, pp. 69-70, which cites a GAO study of
aerospace profitability over the period 1966-1969, and in
The New Face of the Defense Industry , op.cit. , p. 56. For
a discussion of these articles see the next footnote.
54. One of the practical problems encountered in analyzing the
question of the sufficiency of the returns earned by aero-
space firms is the period of time covered by the analysis.
The years 1966-1969 covered by the GAO study referred to in foot-
note 53 preceded the post-Vietnam slump in defense spending,
and much of the empirical evidence cited in the Business Week
article ("The New Face of the Defense Industry") is based on
the same period. In this regard the Brown and Stothoff
study, which focuses on the period 1965-1974, reports statis-
tical results that are less biased.
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55. For example, Risk. Elements In Government Contracting
, op.cit .
56. Profit '76 Summary Report (U.S. Government Printing Office;
Washington, D.C.; December 7, 1976.)
57. The apparent preference of contractors for investing in
facilities to be used in commercial production, rather than
to support government production, was the major justification





58. An overview of the procurement process is provided in
S.J. Evans, H.J. Margulis, and H.B. Yoshpe, Procurement
(Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Washington, D.C.;
1968) . Several excellent analyses of the weapons acquisition
process have been performed. The classic studies are
M.J. Peck and F.M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process :__Ar^
Economic Analysis (Division of Research, Harvard Business
School; Boston; 1962), and F.M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition
Process: Economic Incentives
,
(Division of Research, Harvard
Business School, Boston; 1964). An interesting follow-on
of these studies is Fox, op.cit . An interesting discussion
of the differences between government-contractor transactions
and commercial transactions can be found in J.F. Gorgol,
The Military-Industrial Firm (Prager; New York; 1972), ch. 2.
59. See Peck and Scherer, op.cit
.
, ch. 3, and J.M. Suarez, "Profits
and Performance of Aerospace Defense Contractors," Journal of
Economic Issues (vol. 10; no. 2; June 1976), pp. 386-402, for
more on the non-market character of the weapons acquisition
process.
60. It should be noted, however, that prior to World War II this
commercial-like process was heavily relied on to generate
new ideas for military aircraft. Ibid . , ch. 4.
61. See Aerospace Industries Association of America, Monopsony:
A Fundamental Problem in Government Procurement (Washington,
D.C.; May 1973) and Stanford Research Institute, "The Industry-
Government Aerospace Relationship," two volumes (Menlo Park,
CA; May 1963).
62. See Fox, op.cit .
,
pp. 256-257, 467-471. An interesting theo-
retical discussion of the bidding process can be found in
D.P. Baron, "Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding,"
American Economic Review (vol. 62; no. 3; June 1972), pp.
384-394; C.C. Blaydon and P.W. Marshall, "Incentive Contracts
and Competitive Bidding: Comment," American Economic Review
(vol. 64; no. 6; December 1974), pp. 1070-1071; and D.P. Baron,
"Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding: Reply," American
Economic Review (vol 64; no. 6; December 1974), pp. 1072-1073.
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63. Harr, op. cit.
, p. 13.
64. Due to the abandonment of 'total package procurement' this
latter risk has been reduced substantially in recent years.





65. See footnote 42.
66. See the references listed in footnote 38.
67. See A.M. Agapos and L.E. Gallaway, "Defense Profits and the
Renegotiation Board in the Aerospace Industry," Journal of
Political Economy (vol. 78; no. 5; September/October 1970),
pp. 1093-1105; Weidenbaum, op. cit. , pp. 70-72; and J.F.
Weston, ed., Procurement and Profit Renegotiation
(Wadsworth; San Francisco; 1966).




69. The six factors are the following: the efficiency of the
contractor, the reasonableness of cost and profits, the
amount and source of public and private capital employed,
the extent of risk assumed, the nature and the extent of
the contribution to the defense effort, and the character









71. Weidenbaum, op. cit.
,
p. 72. Weidenbaum argues that the
board's preoccupation with profits rather than costs is
not in the taxpayer's best interests since cost levels and
cost overruns are so much greater in magnitude than profits.
He argues that the board should pay greater attention to the
reasonableness of contractor costs.
72. C. Kaysen, "Improving the Efficiency of Military Research and
Development," in E. Mansfield, ed
.
, Defense, Science, and
Public Policy (W.W. Norton; New York; 1968), p. 119. See
also Harr, op, cit
.




73. See, for example, J. Hirshleifer, Investment, Interest,
and Capital (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; 1970),
p. 215; Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op. cit
.
, p. 2; and
D. Vickers, The Theory of the Firm: Production, Capital,
and Finance (McGraw-Hill; New York; 1968), p. 7.
74. F.H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Houghton Mifflin;
New York; 1921).
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75. G.C. Philippatos, Financial Management Theory and Techniques
(Holden-Day; San Francisco; 1971), pp. 69-70.
76. Ibid.
, p. 70, and J.C. Van Home, Financial Management and
Policy, 2nd ed
. (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.;
1971), pp. 46, 198-200.
77. See, for example, Risk Elements in Government Contracting
,
op. cit.
78. As, for example, the Profit '76 Study. See footnote 56 for
reference.
79. Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op. cit
.
, pp. 2-4.
80. These measures are the ones suggested by Van Home. See
footnote 76 for page references.
81. J.R. Kurth, "Why We Buy the Weapons We Do," Foreign Policy
(no. 11; summer 1973), pp. 43-46, or J.R. Kurth, "Aerospace
Production Lines and American Defense Spending," in S. Rosen,
ed. , Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex
(D.C. Heath; Lexington, Mass.; 1973), pp. 142-144.
82. For a view of the weapons procurement process contrary to
Kurth 's see A. Kanter and S.J. Thorson, "The Weapons Pro-
curement Process: Choosing Among Competing Theories," in
Rosen, op. cit.
, pp. 157-196.
83. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 1975 Annual Report (Fairchild
Industries, Inc; Germantown, MD.)
,
p. 3.
84. Aerospace Profits vs. Risks
y
op .cit.
, p. 2, makes the same
point, although it adopts 'the probability of obtaining
profits substantially below a competitive average' as the
definition of financial risk and suggests 'a firm's dis-
persion (as measured by standard deviation, coefficient of
variation, or skewness) in the rate of return from its trended
mean' as the best statistical measure of overall risk. Ibid.
>
p. 10. The Profit '76 study chose the standard deviation of
the firm's rate of return from its mean over a ten-year period
as its measure of the firm's financial risk. See footnote 56
for a reference.
85. These might also be called research and development risks. Ibid. ,
pp. 2-3. See also Harr, op. cit. , p. 13. For a practical ex-
ample of these risks see "A plague of faulty fighter engines,"
Business Week (August 25, 1975), and "Grumman Confirms Engine
Problems Of F14 Navy Plane," Wall Street Journal (May 21, 1976).
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86. See Aerospace Profits vs. Risks
,
op.cit.
. pp. 2-3. In
particular, the failure to make the required advance in
one area, for example, designing a radar system of the
required size and weight, may necessitate design changes
in other parts of the system, for example, redesigning
other aircraft components to make them smaller and ligh-





88. Defense Procurement Circular No. 76-3 , op.cit.
,
p. 12.
89. Over time the impact of this source of risk may be dulled
by what Kurth calls the 'follow-on imperative': about
the time one major government contract phases out another
one phases in. See Kurth, Why We Buy the Weapons We Do
,
op.cit.
, pp. 38-42, or Kurth, Aerospace Production Lines
and American Defense Spending
T
op.cit.
, pp. 139-142, for
supporting evidence. The reference provided in footnote
82 takes a position contrary to Kurth' s. However, the
observed pattern of follow-on awards may not, in the opinion
of this writer, be the result of government policy designed
to help prospective have-nots, but rather, may simply re-
flect the significant advantages - such as grasp of related
technology, trained labor force, available production fa-
cilities, etc. - a contractor has in bidding on follow-on
contracts.
90. See Sherman, op.cit., pp. 153-154.




93. The twin problems of incurring greater overall cost risk
through subcontracting, while at the same time shifting
cost risk onto subcontractors, become somewhat greater
when work is subcontracted on an international basis, as
it has been on the F-16.
94. Business Week estimates that overcapacity in the U.S. aero-
space industry as of January 1977 might have been as high





p. 58. The impact of such overcapacity is partly mitigated
by the fact that much of the overcapacity is in government-
owned plants. Ibid.
,







p. 13, and Aerospace Profits vs. Risks . op .cit
p. 5.
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and A shakeout for U.S. fighter-plane makers
,
op.cit.
97. See N. Rosenberg "On technological expectations," Economic Journal
(vol. 86; no. 343; September 1976), pp. 523-535. Introducing
an airplane 'too soon' would give competitors an opportunity
to observe market demand and to modify their aircraft to
suit better the needs of potential buyers, while introducing
it 'too late' would let the competitors capture a dominant
position in the market place. Exactly this sort of problem
confronts Boeing and McDonnell Douglas and their decisions
as to when to introduce the next generation of commercial jet
aircraft. See "The Next Commercial Jet . . . If," Business
Week (April 12, 1976).
98. As, for example, Northrop 's and McDonnell Douglas's joint
venture on the F-18. Joint commercial ventures across in-
ternational boundaries are also likely. See "I'm McDonnell
Dassault, buy me," The Economist (August 21, 1976), and




99. In the case of the McDonnell Douglas - Northrop joint venture,
each will act as a prime contractor on a different version of
the same basic aircraft - McDonnell Douglas on the U.S. Navy
version and Northrop on the land-based foreign version of
the F-18. See A shakeout for U.S. fighter-plane makers , op.cit. ,
and The New Face of the Defense Industry
?
op.cit.
100. This was made clear to the author in the course of interviews
with executives of the nine firms listed in footnote 1, and in
particular, during his interview with Joseph G. Gavin, Jr.,
President of Grumman Corp.
101. Government-furnished fixed capital accounts for less than 20
percent of the aerospace industry's total fixed capital.
Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op .cit . , pp. 5-6.
102. This is one of the intentions of the Profit '76 study's recom-
mendations, namely, to get defense contractors to purchase






103. Working capital requirements, expressed per dollar of sales,
are higher in the aerospace industry than in other durable
goods industries because of the long lead times for develop-
ment and the high cost of skilled engineering and technical
talent. The government funds at least one-half of the aero-
space industry's working capital requirements. Aerospace
Profits vs. Risks , op.cit. , pp. 5-6.
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104. The desirability of government-furnished capital is a question
debated among the military airframe builders. On the one hand,
Northrop believes that contractors should own all their own
facilities and bear all the financial and business risks -
even to the extent of doing development work under fixed-
price contracts - and receive greater profits accordingly,
while on the other hand, Grumman believes that DOD should
provide a large portion of the capital and shoulder a large
share of the risks, particularly those associated with research
and development. The New Face of the Defense Industry , op.cit.
,
p. 58. Based on personal interviews, this writer's conclusion
is that the Grumman viewpoint is shared by most, but not all,
of the other major military airframe builders.
105. See Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op.cit . , pp. 10-11; Risk
Elements in Government Contracting , op.cit . , ch. 1; and
F.T. Moore, "Incentive Contracts," in S. Enke, ed. , Defense




, ch. 12; O.W. Williamson, "The Economics of Defense
Contracting: Incentives and Performance," in R.N. McKean,ed.,
Issues in Defense Economics (Columbia University Press; New
York; 1967), pp. 217-256; F.M. Scherer, "The Theory of
Contractual Incentives for Cost Reduction," Quarterly Journal
of Economics (vol. 78; no. 2; May 1964, pp. 257-280; J.J. McCall,
"The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting," American
Economic Review (vol. 60; no. 5; December 1970), pp. 837-846;
and M.E. Canes, "The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting:
Note," American Economic Review (vol. 65; no. 3; June 1975),
pp. 478-483. The Scherer paper is particularly noteworthy
because it offers empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis
that defense contractors are risk averse. Scherer, The Theory




107. These basic contract types, as well as several variations, are
discussed in Evans, Margulis, and Yoshpe, op .cit .
108. Defense Procurement Circular No. 76-3 , op.cit
.
, pp. 12-15.
See also Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op.cit
.
, p. 10.
109. An extreme case in which virtually all risk was borne by the
contractor was the 'total package procurement' policy intro-
duced by Robert McNamara when he was Secretary of Defense.
Under total package procurement, companies were forced to bid
on a fixed-price contract covering both development and pro-
duction, and, as Lockheed's experience on the C-5A transport
contract and Grumman' s experience on the F-14 contract attest,
the contractor's risk of severe financial loss due to such
factors as inflation and unforseen costs were intolerably
high, and as a result, total package procurement has been
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abandoned in favor of separate contracts for development and
production, with the former normally on a cost-plus basis and
with the latter normally on a FPI basis for the early stages













112. For example, Fairchild Industries's attempts to develop its
communications business (see "A Last Run For The Money,"
Forbes (May 15, 1976)) and Rockwell International's acqui-
sition of Admiral Corp. and many other commercially oriented
companies (see "Rockwell walks a rough road to profits,"
Business Week (November 3, 197b) and "Rockwell's surprising
winner: Collins Radio," Business Week (November 15, 19/6)).
In addition, General Dynamics recently announced its inten-
tion to look for potential non-aerospace commercial acquisi-
tions (see "General Dynamics Sees Bright Future On Strength
of Tanker, Fighter Projects," Wall Street Journal (January
27, 1977)).
113. The difference between the median values of the average
return on equity is so much smaller than the difference
between the median values for the average return on total
capital because a significant portion of the major airframe
builders' total capital is provided by the government and
because the major airframe builders tend to have higher
debt-equity ratios than firms in other industries. In
addition, the difference in Table 5 between median return
on total capital for the airframe builders and for all in-
dustries probably understates the true difference because
'total capital' in the table excludes human capital, of
which the aerospace industry has proportionately more than
other industries.
114. More rigorously, a difference of medians test was performed.
See W.L. Hays, Statistics (Holt, Rinehart and Winston;
New York; 1973), pp. 194-197. Testing the null hypothesis
that the average rate of return on equity for the nine major
airframe builders has the same distribution as the average
rate of return on equity for the other eight aerospace firms




against the alternative hypothesis that the other eight firms
have a higher median return yielded a critical (at the .05
level) score of six. Since the 'other' sample had only five
values above the grand median, the null hypothesis could not
be rejected. Since, by inspection, the industry median and
the all-industry median are not significantly different, the
conclusion stated in the text follows.
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115. Several other studies have reached the same conclusion.
For example, see Weidenbaum, op.cit.
, pp. 69-70. It
should be emphasized that this conclusion carries no im-
plication regarding the question of whether profits are
adequate in relation to risks. Further, it should be
noted that if either of the other two measures of profit-
ability in Table 5 are used as the basis of comparison -
as they often are in studies sponsored by the aerospace
industry - then the opposite conclusion is drawn, namely,
that aerospace profits are significantly lower than profits
in other industries. See Aerospace Profits vs. Risks , op.
cit.
, pp. 13-17.
116. See Rockwell walks a rough road to profits , op.cit
.
, for
a discussion of these acquisitions and the growth motive
that lay behind them.
117. This dominance is, of course, one factor that tends to
discourage potential entrants.
118. See R.C. Fraser, A.D. Donheiser, and T.G. Miller, Jr.,
Civil Aviation Development: A Policy and Operations
Analysis (Praeger; New York; 1972), pp. 9-12.
119. Both to replace older, less fuel efficient aircraft and
to meet new federal noise standards. See Harr, op.cit.
,




120. See Nation's Airlines Face A Key Problem: How To Pay for
New Planes , op.cit. The problems, financial and other-
wise, that confront the commercial aircraft end of the
aerospace industry are discussed in R.C. Fraser, A.D.
Donheiser, and T.G. Miller, Jr., op.cit
.
121. See The Next Commercial Jet . . .If , op.cit.
122. Harr, op.cit.
,
p. 14. As a result, losses can be large.
See Lockheed Sets L-1011 Charge Of $515 Million , op.cit.
123. Harr, op.cit
. , pp. 14-15. The significance of foreign sales





125. For example, Fairchild Industries is experiencing large
losses in trying to start up its communications business
and plans to use the profits it hopes to earn on its A-10
contract to pay these start-up costs. See A Last Run For
The Money , op.cit. As a second example, Lockheed has ex-
perienced large losses on its L-1011 TriStar program, but
due to its profitable defense business, is able to meet
bond interest payments. "Haack at Lockheed proclaims an
upturn," Business Week (June 28, 1976.)
130
126. This point was made hy several of the executives inter-
viewed by the author. Problems these firms face in trying
to diversify into commercial markets are discussed in
J.S. Gilmore and D.C. Coddington, Defense Industry Diversi-
fication (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;
Washington, D.C.; January 1966).





Rockwell's surprising winner: Collins Radio , op.cit
.
An
earlier study by Gilmore and Coddington reached the oppo-
site conclusion, namely, that aerospace firms favor growth
by internal means. Gilmore and Coddington, op.cit. How-
ever, their study covered a time period in which the growth
prospects in these firms' traditional markets were excellent.
Since the managers of these firms were preoccupied with
developments in their traditional markets, it is not sur-
prising that Gilmore and Coddington found that the degree of
diversification undertaken by these firms was insignificant
in terms of its impact on company sales and profits.





129. During interviews conducted by the author, executives of
several of the firms that are more heavily dependent on
government sales expressed a desire to see their companies
expand their commercial operations enough to attain a 50-50
sales split between government and non-government business.
David S. Lev/is, Chairman of General Dynamics Corp., has also
stated publicly his company's goal of a 50-50 sales split.
See "General Dynamics renews its Pentagon romance," Business
Week (February 3, 1975).
130. However, as several aerospace executives have recognized,
government sales can provide stability when commercial demand
weakens - provided the business cycle and the political






132. "Anatomy of the Arms Trade," Newsweek (September 6,1976).
133. See, for example, L. Kraar, "Grumman Still Flies For Navy,
But It Is Selling the World," Fortune (February 1976). Over
the last decade Northrop Corp.'s major product has been the F-5
,
the market for which has been almost entirely overseas. See
"The New Adventures of Tom Jones," The New York Times (Sep-
tember 19, 1976).
131
134. See "Belgium Joins Others, Picks U.S. -Built F-16," Wall
Street Journal (June 9, 1975); "The Politics Of The F-16,"
Forbes (December 15, 1976); and "NATO Defense Chiefs Agree
in Principle To Buy AWACS if Financing Is Settled," Wall
Street Journal (December 9, 1976).
135. Harr, op.cit.
,
p. 16. For a practical example, see "Iran
Seeks 300 General Dynamics F-16s, Near Double of What U.S.
Agreed to Sell," Wall Street Journal (September 13, 1976).
136. See "Lockheed Signs $1.03 Billion Agreement With Canada for
Planes, Related Work," Wall Street Journal (July 22, 1976);
Belgium Joins Others, Picks U.S. -Built F-16 , op.cit. ; and
NATO Defense Chiefs Agree in Principle To Buy AWACS if
Financing Is Settled
, op. cit.
137. See "Buying guns to sell planes," Business Week (June 23,
1975).
138. See "European Members of NATO Strive to Build Weapons Industry




p. 15. The foreign-owned airlines have also
contributed greatly to overcapacity on international routes,
and, to the extent that such overcapacity has hurt the U.S.
international airlines financially, this may have had a detri-
mental impact on commercial aircraft sales of the U.S. aero-
space industry. See T. O'Hanlon, "The Mess That Made Beggars
of Pan Am and T.W.A.," Fortune (October 1974).
140. See "Air Transportation: The Real Issues," Government Exec-





142. See Free-world partners plan jets for the 1980s , op.cit.
143. These longer periods are, in one case, a short term planning
period of five years and a long term planning period of ten
years, and in the other case, a short term planning period of
two years and a long term planning period of seven years.
The other seven firms use the one year and five year time
horizons stated in the text.
144. In many cases there is more than one division, as for example,
McDonnell Aircraft Company, which produces mainly military
aircraft, and Douglas Aircraft Company, which produces mainly
commercial aircraft (and which was a separate company until
taken over by McDonnell in 1965) of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
132
145. In several cases, such as LTV's Vought Corp., the aero-
space operations are centralized in a wholly owned sub-
sidiary, rather than a division, and the parent company
is a holding company. For the purposes of this paper,
the distinction between a division and a wholly owned
subsidiary is not an important one since it does not af-
fect the corporate planning process.
146. These are discussed in J.D. Finnerty, "Models of the Firm:
A Survey of the Literature," unpublished paper (Naval
Postgraduate School; Monterey, CA; February 1977), ch. 2.
147. Ibid.
,
ch. 2 (and in particular, section G).
148. Ibid.
,
ch. 2 (and in particular, section H)
.
149. For the eight of the nine firms that have a company presi-
dent - General Dynamics has instead three executive vice
presidents with specific area responsibilities within
which each serves in the same capacity as the president of





) - that individual (and often one
or more other top executives) sits on the board of directors,
150. Major shareholders are particularly influential at McDonnell
Douglas and Rockwell, where they hold top management posi-
tions, including chairman of the board of directors, and
at General Dynamics, where the major shareholder personally
recruited the chairman of the board of directors. See




scribes Chairman Willard F. Rockwell's role in determining
Rockwell International's objectives, and General Dynamics:
Winning in the Aerospace Game , op.cit . , which describes the
influence of the firm's largest stockholder, Henry Crown.
151. To make the author's view of the typical airframe builder's
objectives more clear, it is his belief that each of the
three theories - traditional, managerial, and behavorial -
has something to contribute to the overall understanding
of these firms' objectives, though any one of the three
on its own gives an incomplete picture.




153. The question of weapons system quality and the preferences
of the U.S. government with regard to quality, cost, and





154. This carryover effect is probably stronger the greater is
the technological complementarity between the particular
commercial product and the firm's high technology military
aircraft, e.g. it is likely to be stronger for commercial
aircraft than for such items as refrigerators or canoes.
155. The connection between proposed projects and managerial
emoluments may appear somewhat tenuous. In many cases,
however, a portion of managerial compensation is based on
an incentive compensation scheme, so that proposed pro-
jects can affect compensation through their impact on the
company's performance, For example, Boeing has an incentive




p. 14 and Exhibit 15.
156. For eight of the nine firms - Rockwell, whose fiscal year
ends September 30, is the exception - the fiscal year
parallels the calendar year. Unfortunately, the one ex-
ception makes it necessary to describe the planning cycle
in terms of quarters (of the fiscal year) , rather than in
terms of calendar months.
157. For example, if the objective is held to be expected util-
ity maximization, then specifying the appropriate utility
function involves theoretical, as well as practical, diffi-
culties. See G.M. Heal, The Theory of Economic Planning
(American Elsevier; New York; 1973), ch. 2.
158. For example, formulating the planning problem as a non-
linear programming problem that contained an objective
function that reflected not only the objectives discussed
in section C, but also the existence of uncertainty, and
that also contained the many constraints needed to charac-
terize the real-world planning problem, might lead to any
one, or possibly several, of the problems often encountered
in trying to solve large scale nonlinear programming prob-
lems. See H.M. Wagner, Principles of Operations Research.
2nd ed. (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; 1975),
chs. 14-15.
159. A third reason could be added to the two already mentioned:
a basic distrust of planning models. Several of the plan-
ning executives interviewed by the author were steadfast
in their belief that planning models of any kind - whether
of the mathematical programming variety, of the simulation
variety, or of some other variety - would disrupt, rather
than promote, the long term and short term planning process.
160. The notion of a planning process that is optimal in the
sense of being most cost effective, rather than in the sense
of leading to an optimal solution to the planning problem,
is analogous to Baumol's and Quandt's optimally imperfect
134
rules of thumb for business decisions. See W.J. Baumol
and R.E. Quandt, "Rules of Thumb and Optimally Imperfect
Decisions," American Economic Review (vol.54; no. 2;
March 1964), pp. 23-46,
161. The terms 'division' and 'divisional', it should be re-
emphasized, are used to refer to the principal operating
units of the corporation. These principal operating
units are variously referred to as companies (e.g. Douglas
Aircraft Company and McDonnell Aircraft Company of McDonnell
Douglas Corp.), as divisions (e.g. Convair Division and
Fort Worth Division of General Dynamics Corp.), as subsidi-
aires (e.g. Vought Corp of LTV Corp. and Grumman Aerospace
Corp. of Grumman Corp.), and as groups (e.g. Admiral Group
of Rockwell International Corp.). Often the principal
operating units will themselves have divisions, but in what
follows the focus is on the principal operating units, and
the terms 'division' and 'divisional' refer to these units
only and not to their subdivisions.
162. See the previous footnote.
163. Note that the three plans outline the division's needs for
three classes of resources. The technical plan deals with
human capital resources; the manpower and production plan
deals essentially with labor resources (although managerial
talent also contains a large human capital component); and
the facilities plan deals with physical capital resources.
164. See footnotes 3 and 94.
165. It is almost universially accepted within the industry that
once a new weapons program appears in the Five Year Defense
Plan it is generally too late to begin the research and de-
velopment process for that program.
166. Also, as will be pointed out in the next section, it is the
division's responsibility, in formualting the operating plan,
to allocate sufficient manpower and funds to form the required
bid and proposal teams for those new programs on which the
company (through the division) intends to bid.
167. Early Revival Unlikely As Jumbo-Plane Sales Continue to
Languish , op.cit.
168. Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Lockheed are doing this, but
Boeing's 747 production line and McDonnell Douglas's DC-10
production line were each operating at approximately 20% of
capacity at the end of 1976. Ibid .
169. See "Swissair Seeks to Launch New DC9 Model With Order to
McDonnell Douglas Corp,." Wall Street Journal (January 20,
1977).
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170. For example, an airplane that costs $30 million to build
will involve an interest cost of $250,000 for every month








172. See, for example, T.W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital
(Free Press; New York; 1971); R.A. Wykstra, ed., Human
Capital Formation and Manpower Development (Free Press; New
York; 1971)- B.F. Kiker , ed., Investment in Human Capital
(University of South Carolina Press; Columbia, S.C.; 1971);
F. Welch, "Education in Production," Journal of Political
Economy (vol. 78; no. 1; January-February 1970), pp. 35-59;
and G.S. Becker, Human Capital
, 2nd ed . (Columbia University
Press; New York; 1975) .
173. Schultz, op.cit. , ch. 3.; B.F. Kiker, "The Historical Roots
of the Concept of Human Capital," in Kiker, op .cit
.
, pp.
51-77; and Becker, op.cit. , ch. II. A broader definition
of human capital would also include the skills and know-how
embodied in the firm's production workers, but since the
focal point of this section is long term planning, and in par-
ticular, the allocation of scientists, engineers, designers,
and technicians, the narrower definition provided in the text
seems to this writer more appropriate.
174. The distinction between fixed capital and human capital, as
well as the distinction between these types of capital and
other types of capital, are discussed in the papers cited in
footnote 172.
175. Under the wider definition of human capital, which was men-
tioned in footnote 173, one would have to include also the
services of human capital (embodied in production workers)
that are provided during the production phase of the pro-
gram. This particular flow of human capital services under-
lies the learning curve discussed in section B.
176. This is particularly important in the airframe industry,
where, as discussed in section B, a significant portion
of the total fixed capital is provided by the government.
177. One of the consequences of the human capital embodied in
aerospace engineers and scientists may be the existence of a
segmented labor market for persons embodying these skills
and knowledge. This body of theory is discussed in G.G. Cain,
"The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to Orthodox
Theory; A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature (vol, 14;
no. 4; December 1976), pp. 1215-1257.
136
178. The difficulties and costs associated with trying to
evaluate a prospective employee's stock of human capi-
tal are discussed in J,G. Riley, "Information, Screening
and Human Capital," American Economic Review (vol.66;
no. 2; May 1976), pp. 254-260.
179. And this is likely to become increasingly important as
the Department of Defense implements its new design-to-
cost policy. The policy is outlined in several DOD
and service instructions beginning with Department of
Defense Directive 5000.28, "Design to Cost" (May 23,
1975) . The concept of design to cost is explained in
J.J. Bennett, "Design to Cost", Commander's Digest
(vol. 19; no. 17; August 12, 1976).
180. These firms' reluctance to lay off key engineering
personnel, for example, has led to accusations of
hoarding of engineering personnel. Several studies
have provided evidence that engineering talent is
being wasted in jobs that require only routine skills.
See Peck and Scherer, op.cit
.
, pp. 515-517. This sup-
posed 'hoarding' may, in the opinion of this writer,
still be less costly to the firm than a policy of
hiring and firing due to the potentially high costs




182. The two exceptions are noted in footnote 143. In each
of these cases, however, the first year's operating
plan is given in the greatest detail and is presented
in the form of a budget.
183. The budget preparation process is described in manage-
ment accounting textbooks. See, for example, R.N. Anthony
and G.A. Welsch, Fundamentals of Management Accounting
(Irwin; Homewood, 111; 1974), ch. 11.
184. In some cases, however, the projections for the first few
years of the long term plan are broken out on a quarter-
by-quarter basis.
185. The overhead rate is a ratio that is applied to the cost
of an hour of direct labor in order to allocate indirect
costs, such as general and administrative expenses, de-
preciation and maintenance, utilities, etc., over the
goods produced. Often several different overhead rates
are used. For example, government procurement regulations
favor the following three: a manufacturing overhead rate,
an engineering overhead rate, and a general and adminis-
trative expenses overhead rate. See Defense Procurement
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Circular No. 76-3 , op.cit
.
, p. 11. A general discussion
of overhead rates and their computation can be found in
Anthony and Welsch, op. cit
.
, pp. 70-74. Using their
terminology, the contractor and the government negotiate
a 'predetermined overhead rate' for each overhead cost
pool once a year. The evaluation of overheads as part
of determining contractor fees is discussed in Defense




, pp. 11-12. The
apparent tendency for contractors to try to include in-
direct labor as direct labor in order to reduce the over-
head rates and appear more efficient than they really are
is argued in Peck and Scherer, op .cit.
,
pp. 517-519.
186. This is not meant to suggest that such 'assistance' is
always welcomed by the contractor.
187. Recently, as one result of the Profit '76 study, the
weight attached to contractor performance in determining
the fee to be earned on a contract has been reduced from







189. Due to the importance of meeting delivery schedules, there
may be a tendency for firms to overman. See Peck and
Scherer, op.cit.
, pp. 516-517. Such overmanning, to the
extent that it reduces the risk of late delivery (and poor
contract performance) and to the extent that the cost of
overmanning is borne by the government, constitutes a
transfer of risk from the contractor to the government.





191. Several executives interviewed by the author indicated that,
even when commercial demand is strong, these advance payments
seldom exceed 25% of production costs, as opposed to the
government's provision of progress payments covering 80% of
(allowable) costs.
192. Ibid.
193. This is not meant to imply that divisional managers always
wait until the corporate review to indicate problem areas,
although this may happen. Normally, serious problems are
called to the attention of top management ps they arise,
and the corporate review process is one place where top
management can become forewarned of potential problem areas.
138
REFERENCES
Aerospace Industries Association of America, Aerospace Profits
vs. Risks (Washington, D.C.; June 1977).
, Monopsony: A Fundamental Problem in Government Pro-
curement (Washington, D.C.; May 1973).
—
—
, Risk Elements in Government Contracting (Washington,
D.C.; October 1970).
A.M. Agapos and L.E. Gallaway, "Defense Profits and the Renego-
tiation Board in the Aerospace Industry," Journal of Political
Economy (vol. 78; no. 5; September/October 1970), pp. 1093-1105.
R.N. Anthony and G.A. Welsch, Fundamentals of Management Accounting
(Irwin; Homewood , 111.; 1974).
K.J. Arrow, "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing,"
Review of Economic Studies (vol. 29; 1962), pp. 155-173.
H. Asher, "Cost-Quantity Relationships in the Airframe Industry,"
R-291 (The RAND Corporation; Santa Monica, CA; 1956).
Aviation Week & Space Technology , various issues.
D.P. Baron, "Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding," American
Economic Review (vol. 62; no. 3; June 1972), pp. 384-394.
, "Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding: Reply,"
American Economic Review (vol. 64; no. 6; December 1974),
pp. 1072-1073.
W.J. Baumol and R.E. Quandt , "Rules of Thumb and Optimally Imperfect
Decisions," American Economic Review (vol. 54; no. 2; March 1964),
pp. 23-46.
G.S. Becker, Human Capital , 2nd ed . (Columbia University Press; New
York; 1975).
J.J. Bennett, "Design to Cost," Commander's Digest (August 12, 1976).
C.C. Blaydon and P.W. Marshall, "Incentive Contracts and Competitive
Bidding: Comment", American Economic Review (vol. 64; no. 6;
December 1974), pp. 1070-1071.
The Boeing Company SEC Form 10-K, annual report for company fiscal
year 1975.
139
J.K. Brown and G.S. Stothoff, The Defense Industry: Some Per-
spectives from the Financial Community (Division of Management




G.G. Cain, "The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories
to Orthodox Theory: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature
(vol. 14; no. 4; December 1976), pp. 1215-1257.
M.E. Canes, "The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting: Note^"
American Economic Review (vol. 65; no. 3; June 1975), pp. 478-
483.
S.L. Carroll, "The Airframe Industry," unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation (Harvard University; Cambridge, Mass.; August 1970).
Department of Defense, Defense Procurement Circular Number 76-3
(Washington, D.C.; September 1, 1976).
Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, "Major System Acquisitions"
(January 18, 1977).
Department of Defense Directive 5000.2, "Major System Acquisition
Process" (January 18, 1977).
Department of Defense Directive 5000.28, "Design to Cost" (May
23, 1975).
Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., Dun and Bradstreet Million Dollar
Directory (New York, N.Y.; 1975).
The Economist , various issues.
S. Enke, ed
.
, Defense Management (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.; 1967).
S.J. Evans, H.J. Margulis, and H.B. Yoshpe, Procurement (Industrial
College of the Armed Forces; Washington, D.C.; 1968).





Fairchild Industries, Inc., SEC Form 10-K, annual report for company
fiscal year 1975.
J.D. Finnerty, "Models of the Firm: A Survey of the Literature ,"






"The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Corporations,"
Fortune (May 1971) .
"The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Corporations,"
Fortune (May 1976).
"The Fortune Directory of the Second 500 Largest Industrial Corpora-
tions," Fortune (June 1976).
J.R. Fox, Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons (Division
of Research, Harvard Business School; Boston; 1974).
R.C. Fraser, A.D. Donheiser, and T.G. Miller, Jr., Civil Aviation
Development: A Policy and Operations Analysis (Praeger; New
York; 1972).
General Dynamics Corporation SEC Form 10-K, annual report for company
fiscal year 1975.
J.S. Gilmore and D.C. Coddington, Defense Industry Diversification
(U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Washington, D.C;
January 1966)
.




Grumman Corporation SEC Form 10-K, annual report for company fiscal
year 1975.
K.G. Harr, Jr., "A Short Course in Aerospace Economics 1976,"
Aerospace (September 1976), pp. 6-16.
K. Hartley, "The Learning Curve and Its Application to the Aircraft
Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics (vol. 13; no. 2;
March 1965), pp. 122-128.
W.L. Hays, Statistics (Holt, Rinehart and Winston; New York; 1973).
G.M. Heal, The Theory of Economic Planning (American Elsevier;
New York; 1973).
W.Z. Hirsch, "Firm Progress Ratios," Econometrica (vol. 24; no. 2;
April 1956), pp. 136-143.
J. Hirshleifer, Investment, Interest, and Capital (Prentice-Hall;
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; 1970).
A. Kanter and S.J. Thorson, "The Weapons Procurement Process:




the Theory of the Military Industrial Complex .
C. Kaysen, "Improving the Efficiency of Military Research and
and Development," in E. Mansfield, ed
.
, Defense, Science, and
Public Policy .
141
B.F. Kiker, "The Historical Roots of the Concept of Human Capital,"
in B.F. Kiker, ed
.
, Investment in Human Capital .
, ed . , Investment in Human Capital (University of South
Carolina Press; Columbia, S.C.; 1971)
F.H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Houghton Mifflin;
New York; 1921).
L. Kraar, "Grumman Still Flies For Navy, But It Is Selling the
World," Fortune (February 1976).
J.R. Kurth, "Aerospace Production Lines and American Defense
Spend ing," in S. Rosen, ed
.
, Testing the Theory of the Military-
Industrial Complex .
,
"Why We Buy The Weapons We Do," Foreign Policy
,
(Number
11; Summer 1973), pp. 33-56.
The LTV Corporation SEC Form 10-K, annual report for company fiscal
year 1975.
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation SEC Form 10-K, annual report for
company fiscal year 1975.
E. Mansfield, ed
.
, Defense, Science, and Public Policy (W.W. Norton;
New York; 1968) .
J.J. McCall, "The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting,"
American Economic Review (vol. 60; no. 5; December 1970),
pp. 837-846.
McDonnell Douglas Corporation SEC Form 10-K, annual report for
company fiscal year 1975.
R.N. McKean, ed., Issues in Defense Economics (Columbia University
Press; New York; 1967)
.
F.T. Moore, "Incentive Contracts", in S. Enke, ed., Defense
Management .
"The New Adventures of Tom Jones ." New York Times (September 19,
1976).
Newsweek , September 6, 1976 issue.
Northrop Corporation SEC Form 10-K, annual report for company
fiscal year 1975.
T. O'Hanlon, "The Mess That Made Beggers of Pan Am and T.W.A,"
Fortune (October 1974)
142
M.J. Peck and F.M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process:
An Economic Analysis (Division of Research, Harvard Business
School; Boston; 1962).
G.C. Philippatos, Financial Management Theory and Techniques
(Holden-Day; San Francisco; 1971).
Profit '76 Summary Report (U.S. Government Printing Office;
Washington, D.C.; December 7, 1976).
W.C. Ridder and M.K. Heinz, "Structure, Conduct, and Performance
of the United States Aerospace Industry
y
" unpublished M.S.
thesis (Naval Postgraduate School; Monterey, CA. ; March 1976).
J.G. Riley, "Information, Screening and Human Capital," American
Economic Review (vol. 66; no. 2; May 1976), pp. 254-260.
Rockwell International Corporation SEC Form 10-K, annual report
for company fiscal year 1975.
S.J. Rosen, ed
.
, Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial
Complex (D.C. Heath; Boston; 1973).
N. Rosenberg, "On technological expectations," Economic Journal
(vol. 86; no. 343; September 1976), pp. 523-535.
F.M. Scherer, "The Theory of Contractual Incentives for Cost
Reduction," Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. 78; no. 2;
May 1964), pp. 257-280.
, The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives
(Division of Research, Harvard Business School; Boston; 1964).
T.W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital (Free Press; New York;
1971).
R. Sherman, The Economics of Industry (Little, Brown and Company;
Boston; 1974).
Standard and Poor's Corp., Standard and Poor's Register of Corpora-
tions, Directors, and Executives , vol. 3 (New York, N.Y.;
January 1975).
Stanford Research Institute, "The Industry-Government Aerospace
Relationship," two volumes (Menlo Park, CA. ; May 1963).
H.O. Stekler, The Structure and Performance of the Aerospace
Industry (University of California Press; Berkley; 1965).
J.M. Suarez, "Profits and Performance of Aerospace Defense Contractors,
Journal of Economic Issues (vol. 10; no. 2; June 1976), pp. 386-402.
J.C. Van Home, Financial Management and Policy , 2nd ed . (Prentice-
Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; 1971).
143
P.J. Verdoorn, "Complementarity and Long-Range Projections,"
Econometrica (vol. 24; no. 4; October 1956)
, pp. 429-450.
D. Vickers, The Theory of the Firm: Production, Capital, and
Finance (McGraw-Hill; New York; 1968).
H.M. Wagner, Principles of Operations Research , 2nd ed . (Prentice-
Hall; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; 1975).
The Wall Street Journal , various issues.
S.C. Webb, Managerial Economics (Houghton Mifflin; Boston; 1976).
M.L. Weidenbaum, The Economics of Peacetime Defense (Praeger;
New York; 1974).
F. Welch, "Education in Production," Journal of Political Economy
(vol. 78; no. 1; January-February 1970), pp. 35-59.
J.F. Weston, ed. , Procurement and Profit Renegotiation (Wadsworth;
San Francisco; 1966).
O.E. Williamson, "The Economics of Defense Contracting: Incentives
and Performance," in R.N. McKean, ed
.
, Issues in Defense Economics
T.P. Wright, "Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes," Journal of
the Aeronautical Sciences (vol. 3; no. 4; February 1936), pp.
122-128.
R.A. Wykstra, ed., Human Capital Formation and Manpower Development




Operations Research Program 3
Code 434
Office of Naval Research
Washington, D.C. 20360




Office of Naval Research Branch Office
495 Summer Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02210
Office of Naval Research 1
New York Area Office
207 West 24th Street
New York, New York 10011
Director 1
Office of Naval Research Branch Office
219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Director 1
Office of Naval Research Branch Office
1030 East Green Street
Pasadena, California 91101
Office of Naval Research 1
San Francisco Area Office
50 Fell Street
San Francisco, California 94102






Professor D.A. Schrady (Code 05) 1




Professors R.W. Butterworth (Code 55 Bd)
J.D. Esary (Code 55 Ey)
F.D. Faulkner (Code 53 Fa)
G.T. Howard (Code 55 Hk)
C.R. Jones (Code 54 Js)
K.T. Marshall (Code 55 Mt)
M.O. Soverign (Code 55 So)
D.R. Whipple (Code 54 Wp)
CO. Wilde (Code 53 Wm)
K.E. Woehler (Code 61 Wh)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940





















processes of the ma-
jor U. S. mi 1 itary





3 2768 00478010 6
